G.R. No. 200015 - Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Philippine Institute of Civil Engineers, Inc. and Leo Cleto Gamolo

First marriage: six children – Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario, and Celerina.
Second marriage with Ignacia Akutin: five children – Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and Emma.

Getulia, a child of the first marriage, predeceased her father on October 2, 1923, leaving behind seven children (Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen, Trinidad, Luz, Alberto, and Minda).

The will was admitted to probate on March 21, 1932.
In his testament, Agripinio Neri y Chavez declared that his children from the first marriage were to have no further participation in his estate on the ground that they had already received their respective shares during his lifetime as advancements.
No express statement or provision regarding betterments or legacies in favor of the children by the second marriage was made.

At the hearing for the declaration of heirs, the trial court found that, except for Eleuterio, the children of the first marriage had not received any inheritance advancement during the testator’s lifetime, contrary to the testator’s belief as evidenced in his will.
Consequently, the trial court rendered judgment declaring both the children from the first and the second marriages as intestate heirs, with a specific provision that one-half of the improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal partnership should belong to Ignacia Akutin.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision but modified it by holding that the will was “valid with respect to the two-thirds part which the testator could freely dispose of.”

Provides that a disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or for a cause which cannot be proved if contradicted, shall annul the institution of the heir to the extent that prejudice is caused to the disinherited, while legacies, betterments, and other dispositions not encroaching upon the legitime remain valid.
The Court of Appeals relied on this provision, presuming that the testator intended to disinherit the children of the first marriage, though this inference was not supported by any deliberate or fictitious act.

Describes preterition as the omission in a will of one or more forced heirs, either by not mentioning them or by mentioning them without instituting them as heirs or expressly disinheriting them.
The absence of explicit betterments or legacies in favor of the second marriage’s children is crucial, leading to the presumption of preterition.

The appellate court cited opinion from Manresa, distinguishing cases where the forced heir was alive at the time of the execution of the will from those born later, applying different doctrines (the article 851 and article 814 principles).
The Court observed that the doctrine of preterition applies uniformly irrespective of whether the forced heir was known or not at the time of the will's execution.

Whether the omission of the children of the first marriage in the testament annuls the institution of the children of the second marriage as heirs.

Is the omission an act of disinheritance, or does it constitute a mere mistake regarding the advancement of the first marriage’s children?
How do the provisions of articles 851 and 814 of the Civil Code apply to the case, particularly regarding voluntary and involuntary preterition?

Whether the part of the estate supposedly disposed of by the testator through his will is valid regarding legacies or betterments, or if it must be considered as giving rise to intestate succession.