G.R. No. L-45487 - Nepomuceno vs. Secretary of National Defense

The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court en banc’s Resolution dated August 10, 1978, which dismissed their petition for habeas corpus and mandamus on the ground of mootness and academic character.
The Resolution noted that petitioners had been temporarily released pursuant to the Aquino, Jr. doctrine, with most being released on June 21, 1978, and one petitioner on June 22, 1978, thereby eliminating any need for further relief regarding their detention.

Originally, the petition solely sought a writ of habeas corpus to challenge their detention under martial law conditions.
Petitioners later expanded their relief request by including a petition for prohibition with a preliminary injunction, aiming to enjoin the prosecution and trial for alleged offenses committed prior to their arrest.

Petitioners contended that their right to a speedy trial was denied, which, in their view, should preclude the State’s right to prosecute them further.
They argued that their release did not resolve the underlying issue of a delayed trial and that the pending charges before Military Commission No. 5 still exposed them to the risk of prosecution and re-incarceration.

The petitioners’ case was marked by delays in the filing of charges, which they attribute to an alleged denial of their constitutional right to speedy trial.
The delays were partially linked to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under martial law, intended as a measure of national security against a backdrop of a nationwide conspiracy and continuing rebellion.
The petitioners had not yet been arraigned because of their legal challenge questioning the constitutionality and competence of Military Commission No. 5, further complicating the initiation of trial proceedings.

Whether the alleged delay in filing charges and setting the trial constitutes a denial of the petitioners’ constitutional right to a speedy trial.

Does the delay, under the circumstances of martial law and the suspension of habeas corpus, meet the threshold of being vexatious, capricious, or oppressive?
Can the State’s right to prosecute be said to have been forfeited due to the delay, as argued by the petitioners?

Whether the petitioners’ subsequent claims—beyond the initial petition for habeas corpus—regarding the prosecution and trial before Military Commission No. 5 are procedurally and substantively affected by their temporary release.

Is the issue of denial of speedy trial still open for resolution despite the petitioners’ release?
What is the proper forum for resolving the question of the alleged denial of the speedy trial if it remains unaddressed?