G.R. No. 130106 - People vs. Tria-Tirona

Petitioner Neplum, Inc., as private offended party, was involved in Criminal Case No. 96-246 where the accused was charged with estafa.
On October 29, 1999, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 133) promulgated its judgment acquitting the accused based on reasonable doubt; the accused, her counsel, and both public and private prosecutors were present during promulgation.
The private prosecutor represented petitioner as the private offended party.

On November 12, 1999, petitioner received a copy of the judgment through the private prosecutor.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) on November 29, 1999.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration via order dated January 24, 2000, which petitioner received on January 28, 2000.
On January 31, 2000, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and an Amended Notice of Appeal from the judgment.
On February 17, 2000, the RTC issued an order denying due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal, effectively prohibiting petitioner from appealing the civil aspect of the judgment.

The RTC held that the Notice of Appeal was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, counted from the date of promulgation of the decision (October 29, 1999).
Therefore, the judgment had become final and executory, and the appeal was disallowed.

Petitioner contended that the 15-day period to appeal should be counted from actual receipt of the written judgment, i.e., November 12, 1999, not from the date of promulgation.
Petitioner argued the right to appeal the civil aspect is a separate, quasi-civil matter requiring written notice to file an intelligent appeal.

Respondent and RTC maintained that the period to appeal should be counted from the date of promulgation, consistent with previous jurisprudence governing criminal appeals by the accused.

Whether the 15-day period within which a private offended party may appeal the civil aspect of a judgment acquitting the accused based on reasonable doubt should be counted from the date of promulgation of the judgment or from the time the party received actual or constructive notice of the judgment.