G.R. No. L-23408 - Narag vs. Cecilio

Dolores Narag, the plaintiff-appellant, claimed that before the death of her father, he gave her two parcels of land (one agricultural and one residential) in 1924 through a deed of donation Mortis Causa.
After the deed of donation, the plaintiff duly declared the parcels in her name and continuously possessed the land in the concept of an owner—openly, publicly, and adversely against the whole world.
The factual timeline indicates that from 1924 up to the filing of the amended complaint, the plaintiff was in continuous possession of the land.

Upon the death of her natural father in 1950 (who was also the legitimate father of the defendants), the defendants, Salvador Cecilio and Antonio Cecilio, forcibly seized the properties.
The defendants claimed adverse title over the land, acting through force, stealth, and strategy, despite the plaintiff’s repeated verbal and written demands for an amicable settlement from 1950 until the filing of the complaint.
The plaintiff prayed for an order directing the defendants to deliver the parcels to her as she was the rightful owner.

In the answer to the amended complaint, the defendants raised an affirmative defense asserting that the plaintiff’s possession was invalid due to the absence of "good faith and just title."
The lower court, relying on Articles 1129 and 1130 of the Civil Code, dismissed the complaint on the ground that the donation Mortis Causa was invalid because it lacked the formalities (e.g., attestation clause and signatures of the donor and three instrumental witnesses) and thus failed to provide a "just title."
The lower court’s order emphasized that for title prescription under the Civil Code, the title must be both true and valid—a contention that formed the basis of dismissal with costs against the plaintiff.

The lower court erroneously relied on the Civil Code rather than on Section 41 of Act 190 (the former Code of Civil Procedure), which is the controlling provision for acquisitive prescription.
There was a misapprehension that a "just title" was a requisite for adverse possession, leading to the dismissal of a petition that should have been assessed on the basis of continuous adverse possession alone.
The judge’s error is noted as “plain and palpable,” given that the Supreme Court had consistently interpreted Section 41 as not requiring the element of good faith or a just title.

Following the death of plaintiff Dolores Narag on March 21, 1971, her legitimate children were substituted as appellants.
The record indicates that the defendants’ adverse possession has now been virtually admitted, and that the deprivation of possession has lasted long enough to invoke the remedy of acquisitive prescription.
The lower court's misapplied reasoning ultimately led the appellate court to consider the merits of the restoration of possession and the awarding of damages.

Whether the lower court erred in requiring the element of a "just title" (good title) for the acquisition of land through adverse possession.

Did the lower court misinterpret the controlling legal standard by relying on the Civil Code provisions instead of Section 41 of Act 190?
Is the requirement of a valid or "just" title necessary for acquiring land through adverse possession under the applicable law?

Whether the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed or if the remedy should be adjusted to order the immediate restoration of possession.

Given the continuous, open, and adverse possession for more than ten years, should the adverse possession doctrine prevail regardless of any alleged deficiencies in the donation?
What is the appropriate remedy considering the prolonged deprivation of possession and the substantial harm suffered by the plaintiff (and now her heirs)?

The broader implication regarding the effect of misapplied statutory interpretations on the right of a possessor to acquire title by prescription.

Should the existing jurisprudence favor a strict adherence to the literal language of Section 41 of Act 190 over ancillary requirements set forth by the Civil Code?