G.R. No. 198270 - Morillo vs. People

In July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, together with Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil—introducing themselves as contractors under the name RB Custodio Construction—purchased construction materials from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies.
The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchase amount would be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery, with the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery by means of post-dated checks.
Petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total of ₱500,054.00 at the construction site in Pampanga, where respondent and his partners were working.

After the last delivery, respondent paid ₱20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of ₱393,000.00 and ₱87,054.00.
Upon presenting the checks for payment at petitioner’s Equitable PCI Bank account in Makati City, both checks were dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.”
Respondent reissued two new post-dated checks with assurances they would be honored, but these, too, were dishonored under similar circumstances.
Despite repeated demands by the petitioner, respondent and his partners failed to settle the amount, prompting the filing of a criminal complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City.

On August 12, 2004, two Informations were filed charging respondent (and companion Milo Malong in one case) with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing checks without sufficient funds.
The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, in its Joint Decision dated September 3, 2008, found respondent Natividad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of BP 22, sentencing him to fines and ordering a joint payment of the face value of the checks with interest and penalty.
Acquittal was rendered for accused Milo Malong due to reasonable doubt.
Respondent appealed the MeTC decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the ground of improper venue, specifically contending that the acts linked to the offense had occurred in Pampanga—not Makati City.
On February 23, 2009, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling, holding that challenges based on jurisdictional venue were without merit given the transitory nature of the offense.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the lower courts’ rulings in its Decision dated January 18, 2011, dismissing the case on the ground that the essential elements of the offense occurred in Pampanga rather than in Makati City.
The CA reasoning emphasized that the check was drawn and issued in Pampanga, and the element of knowledge of dishonor allegedly transpired there, thereby precluding Makati’s jurisdiction.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, arguing that the MeTC of Makati City was the proper venue because the deposit and presentation for encashment occurred there.

Petitioner contended that jurisdiction should lie in Makati City where the check was deposited and subsequently dishonored, citing precedents such as Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.
Respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the essential elements of the offense—issuance, delivery, and actual dishonor—occurred outside Makati, thus challenging the proper venue.
Additional procedural arguments involved the issue of whether a non-OSG party could file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, given that appeals from dismissals are typically handled by the OSG, and whether the dismissal by the appellate court amounted to an acquittal provoking double jeopardy concerns.

The Supreme Court analyzed the transitory (or continuing) nature of BP 22 offenses, where jurisdiction may lie in any municipality where an essential element occurred.
It held that the act of depositing the check in Makati, coupled with the occurrence of its subsequent dishonor there, conferred proper jurisdiction on the Makati MeTC.
The Court rejected the CA’s narrow interpretation that only actions in Pampanga were relevant.
In addressing procedural objections regarding the filing by a private party without OSG representation and double jeopardy, the Court observed that dismissal on technical jurisdictional grounds did not equate to an acquittal.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the CA Decision (January 18, 2011) and Resolution (August 9, 2011), and reinstated the RTC Decision (February 23, 2009) and Order (July 13, 2009).

Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City had jurisdiction over the case despite arguments that the significant elements of the offense occurred in Pampanga.
Whether the act of depositing and presenting the check for encashment in Makati City is an essential element that confers jurisdiction, even though other acts, such as issuance and delivery, took place in Pampanga.

Whether the violation of BP 22 constitutes a transitory or continuing crime, allowing the case to be tried in any municipality where any essential element occurred.
How the differentiation between the place of deposit and the place of issue/delivery of the check affects the determination of venue.

Whether a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, filed by the private offended party rather than the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), is procedurally proper.
Whether the appellate court’s dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue should be treated as an acquittal and thus trigger double jeopardy protections.

The proper application of doctrines and precedents (such as those in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, Rigor v. People, and Yalong v. People) in determining the venue for crimes involving bounced checks.
Whether the technicalities in the rules of procedure should yield to the ends of substantial justice when adjudicating the venue issue.