G.R. No. 145425 - Moll vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioner Salvador K. Moll was elected vice-mayor of the Municipality of Malinao, Albay in 1989.
In April 1989, he entered into a memorandum of agreement with Ysmael Zepeda on behalf of the local government, authorizing Zepeda to administer the catching and sale of bangus in the coastal waters of Malinao.
The duly elected mayor at the time, Mayor Misericordia Clavecilla, asserted that neither the petitioner nor the members of the Sangguniang Bayan had the authority to enter into such a contract.
Acting on the mayor’s assertion, criminal charges were filed against petitioner.

For violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco, Albay (an appeal remains pending at the Sandiganbayan).
For usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 4088 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tiwi-Malinao.

The judgment promulgation was initially set for April 21, 1999, then postponed to May 5, 1999, due to the absence of petitioner and counsel.
On May 4, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, with its hearing set for May 11, 1999.
Despite the pending motion to quash, the promulgation was rescheduled for May 5, 1999, again postponed because petitioner’s counsel did not appear on prior dates.
On May 11, 1999, after oral arguments and deliberations on the motion to quash—subsequently denied—the MCTC proceeded to record the judgment in the criminal docket despite vehement objections from petitioner’s defense.

Defense counsel objected to the promulgation process, arguing that the absence of the accused made the proceeding unlawful and unfair due to repeated postponements.
Petitioner claimed a denial of due process by contending that the repeated rescheduling and proceeding without his presence violated his right to be heard.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the denial of the motion to quash (filed on June 18, 1999), which was denied.
Petitioner also pursued judicial relief through:

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, later dismissed for insufficiency in form and substance, along with a subsequent motion for reconsideration.
A petition for review under Rule 42 before the Court of Appeals filed on October 18, 1999, which the appellate court denied on May 22, 2000, upholding that petitioner had ample opportunity to be heard.

Further motions for reconsideration were filed in the appellate level, each being denied.
On October 30, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, contending that the improper promulgation of judgment deprived him of his right to appeal within the prescribed period.

This petition was denied in a resolution dated December 6, 2000, due to failure to comply with reglementary requirements (timely appeal, legal fees, certification against forum-shopping, and affidavit of service).
Two subsequent motions for reconsideration were filed in 2001 and 2002, both of which were denied with warnings not to file further pleadings.

On May 16, 2001, an entry of judgment was made in Criminal Case No. 4088.
Despite the finality of the judgment, on October 24, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Elevate the case to the Court en banc, which was denied on November 26, 2002, citing lack of merit and procedural grounds under Circular No. 2-89.
Returning to the issue of his arrest, on September 10, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Lift, Recall, and/or Withdraw the warrant of arrest, asserting:

The delay occasioned by allowing the Solicitor General to file his comment on the second motion for reconsideration.
The threat of imminent arrest due to a trial court-issued warrant, which petitioner argued was compounded by the trial court’s earlier refusal to lift such a warrant.

Ultimately, the Court denied the urgent motion to elevate the case, as well as the motion to lift/recall the warrant of arrest. The Court admonished petitioner and counsel not to file further pleadings and ordered the execution of the final judgment without further delay.

Whether the repeated postponements of the promulgation of judgment, coupled with petitioner’s absence during scheduled hearings, constituted a denial of his right to due process.
Whether the petitioner’s objections regarding the manner of promulgation were valid under the constitutional right to be heard.

Whether the motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy was meritorious.
Whether the procedure followed by the trial court in postponing and eventually recording the judgment properly accommodated the rights of the accused.

Whether the trial court and subsequent appellate courts acted in accordance with the prescribed procedural requirements by rescheduling and proceeding with the promulgation despite prior absences by petitioner and counsel.
Whether the petitioner’s claim that the period for appeal never commenced due to improper promulgation holds merit.

Whether the multiple motions for reconsideration, petitions for review, and urgent motions to elevate the case or lift the warrant were legally tenable considering the finality of the judgment.
Whether any exceptional or compelling circumstances justified the Court in entertaining these repeated filings.