G.R. No. 149719 - Moldex Realty, Inc. vs. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

Petitioner Moldex Realty, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in real estate development and the developer of Metrogate Complex Phase I, a subdivision in Meycauayan, Marilao, Bulacan.
In 1988, HLURB issued petitioner a License to Sell for 696 parcels within the subdivision.
In 1993, lot buyers and homeowners in the subdivision formally organized as the Metrogate Complex Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (respondent association).

Since subdivision completion, petitioner subsidized and paid for maintenance of common facilities including streetlight operation and corresponding electric bills.
In 2000, petitioner stopped paying electric bills for streetlights and requested respondent association to assume the obligation.
Respondent association refused to pay, resulting in Meralco's discontinuance of streetlight service.
Respondent association filed for preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction with HLURB aimed at obliging petitioner to pay.

On April 5, 2001, Editha U. Barrameda, HLURB Regional Officer, issued a Resolution granting the association’s injunction application, relying on PD Nos. 957 and 1216, and HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994.
HUDCC Resolution No. R-562 (1994) required subdivision developers to maintain streetlights and pay electric consumption until turnover to local government after complete development.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on May 28, 2001.
After bond posting, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on June 28, 2001, ordering petitioner to pay the electricity cost from December 2000 onward until turnover.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the injunction writ, administrative Resolution (April 5, 2001), Order (May 28, 2001), and to nullify HUDCC Resolution No. R-562 (1994) as unconstitutional.
While pending, HUDCC approved Board Resolution No. R-699 (2001), amending the relevant rules including the obligation to pay streetlight electricity costs.
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s petition for lack of proof of authority for verification and directed petitioner to raise constitutional issues directly with the Supreme Court.
Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, contesting the constitutionality of HUDCC Resolution No. R-562 (1994) and HLURB's imposition of the payment obligation on petitioner.

Respondent association argued the petition filed with the Supreme Court was tardy and the prior filing with the CA did not toll the 60-day period.
The Solicitor General concurred with respondent’s position on timeliness and asserted that jurisdiction over the petition properly lies with the Regional Trial Court, not the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues the continuous nature of the alleged injury allows raising constitutionality issues repeatedly and timely, claiming no delay existed.
The petition also showed that the issue raised does not possess "transcendental importance" warranting bypass of lower courts.

Amending HUDCC Resolution No. R-699 (2001) superseded R-562 (1994) provisions on the payment of streetlight electricity, rendering the matter moot and academic.
The HUDCC, an indispensable party, was not impleaded in either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court petition, affecting the finality and jurisdiction of the proceedings.

Whether HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, is constitutional or a void exercise of legislative power.
Whether HLURB committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction based on the alleged void HUDCC Resolution.
Whether petitioner’s obligation to pay streetlight electricity bills continues under the applicable regulations.
Whether the Supreme Court or lower courts have jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Whether the petition filed before the Supreme Court is timely considering the rule on the 60-day reglementary period.
Whether the petition became moot and academic due to the adoption of the new HUDCC Board Resolution No. R-699 (2001).
The effect of petitioner’s failure to join HUDCC as an indispensable party in the proceedings.