G.R. No. 187256 - Mendoza vs. Villas

Republic Act No. 11199, or the Social Security Act of 2018, was signed into law on February 7, 2019.
The law introduced compulsory coverage by the Social Security System (SSS) for both sea-based and land-based Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs).
Land-based OFWs are treated in the same manner as self-employed persons under the law.
Key provisions under Section 9-B relevant to this case include:

Subsection (a) mandates compulsory SSS coverage for all sea-based and land-based OFWs not over 60 years old.
Subsection (c) states that land-based OFWs are compulsory members of the SSS and considered like self-employed persons.
Subsection (e) mandates the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), and SSS to ensure compulsory coverage through bilateral social security and labor agreements.

Pursuant to Section 30 of the law, the Social Security Commission promulgated IRR published on June 2, 2019.
Rule 14 of the IRR details compulsory coverage of OFWs.
The challenged IRR provisions include Sections 1, 5, 5.a, 5.b, 6, 7(iii), and 7(iv) which:

Set compulsory coverage and the basis of contributions for land-based OFWs.
Establish a minimum monthly salary credit (MSC) for land-based OFWs and contribution payment deadlines.
Provide enforcement mechanisms including using the issuance of Overseas Employment Certificates (OEC) as a prerequisite for deployment, requiring payment of contributions in advance for land-based OFWs in countries without bilateral agreements.
Mandate cooperation among DFA, DOLE, SSS, and Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for enforcement and coverage.

Migrante International and several individual OFWs and partylist representatives (collectively Migrante International et al.) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
They seek to nullify subsections (a), (c), and (e) of Section 9-B of RA 11199 and the specified IRR provisions as unconstitutional.
Grounds include violation of the equal protection clause, unjust deprivation of property without due process, and violation of the constitutional right to travel.
Petitioners also seek to prohibit respondents – SSS, DFA, DOLE, and POEA — from enforcing these provisions.

Procedural: They claim to have legal standing as OFWs, an association, and legislators raising transcendental issues; actual controversy exists; and the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper.
Substantive:

The law violates the equal protection clause for treating land-based OFWs differently, imposing full contribution burden without employer support, unlike local and sea-based employees.
The IRR’s use of OEC issuance conditioned on payment of SSS contributions is ultra vires and unduly oppressive.
The advance collection requirement deprives OFWs of property without due process and violates their right to travel.

Procedural: Petitioners lack standing as individual OFWs have not shown present injury; Migrante association failed to prove authority to represent members; legislators’ claim lacks basis.
The petition bypassed lower courts and proper remedies.
Substantive:

RA 11199 and its IRR presume constitutionality.
The different treatment of land-based OFWs is reasonable given the absence of enforceable employer contributions abroad; thus land-based OFWs are akin to self-employed persons.
The collection mechanism via OEC issuance is a valid exercise of police power.
The payment condition before OEC issuance does not violate the right to travel due to the regulatory nature of overseas employment.

Is a petition for certiorari and prohibition the proper remedy to challenge the constitutional validity of RA 11199 and its IRR provisions?
Is direct resort to the Supreme Court justified without exhausting other remedies?
Do petitioners have the requisite standing and does an actual case or controversy exist for judicial review?

Do subsections (a), (c), and (e) of Section 9-B of RA 11199 and specified IRR provisions violate the equal protection clause?
Is the compulsory collection mechanism under Rule 14, Section 7(iii) of the IRR a valid exercise of the State’s police power?
Does Rule 14, Section 7(iii) of the IRR violate the constitutional right to travel?