G.R. No. 131814 - People vs. Arizapa

Marvin Mercado, along with co-accused Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, and Enrile Bertumen, was charged and convicted for violation of Republic Act No. 6538 (The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended).
The trial court originally imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal with a minimum term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to a maximum of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals increased the maximum penalty to thirty (30) years, thereby prompting the issue of whether the case should have been certificated to the Supreme Court under Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Petitioner argued that the increase of the penalty by the appellate court to thirty (30) years should have triggered the certification requirement because that penalty allegedly equated to reclusion perpetua.
The contention focused on whether the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, which mandates automatic certification when the imposed penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher, was applicable in this case.

On the evening of May 26, 1996, Leonardo Bhagwani parked an Isuzu Trooper in front of his residence in Makati City. The vehicle, owned by Augustus Zamora, was utilized in a joint venture.
The following day, the vehicle went missing, prompting Bhagwani to report the incident to the police and the Anti-Carnapping Division, which then issued an Alarm Sheet.
On May 31, 1996, a neighbor (fireman Avelino Alvarez) conveyed information regarding the theft, having learned from his daughter—who was also the common-law wife of Michael Cummins—that the car was taken by the accused individuals.
Later on the same day, in a confrontation at the residence of SPO3 aMilinga Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen, and Rommel Flores admitted to taking the vehicle for an outing to Laguna, La Union, and Baguio.
They alleged that the act was committed with the knowledge and consent of Bhagwani, who was even invited to join but ultimately declined. The key evidence included the breaking of a quarter window of the vehicle, indicating that force was used to gain entry.
Although petitioner Marvin Mercado was not present during the crucial confrontation, his involvement was narrated by his co-accused as part of the commission of the crime.

The Anti-Carnapping Act provides for different penalties depending on the circumstances:

In cases committed without violence or intimidation, the penalty is "not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months" to "not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months."
When the offense is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by force upon things, the penalty ranges from "not less than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months" to "not more than thirty (30) years."

The trial court’s imposition of a minimum penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day was inconsistent with the minimum stipulated under RA 6538.
The Court of Appeals modified the penalty within the applicable range but still faced the issue of calibration between the imposed maximum (30 years) and the mandatory requirements of the law.

Whether the increased penalty of thirty (30) years, imposed by the Court of Appeals, automatically invoked the certification rule under Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Whether reclusion temporal, as imposed in the case, qualifies as a penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher in the context of the certification rule.

Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court and subsequently modified by the appellate court was consistent with the prescribed minimum and maximum penalties under RA 6538.
Whether the use of the term "reclusion temporal" in the trial court’s decision was appropriate given the specific penalties enumerated in the Anti-Carnapping Act.

Whether the accused’s act—specifically the breaking of the vehicle’s window and the subsequent use of the vehicle—warrants the imposition of the full penalty range under the law as contended by the prosecution.
Whether the alleged justification provided by the accused (that the vehicle was taken merely for a joyride with consent) is a factual issue that should be re-evaluated in a petition for review on certiorari.