G.R. No. L-30894 - Martelino vs. Alejandro

The case arises from alleged court-martial proceedings against Major Eduardo L. Martelino (alias Abdul Latif Martelino) and other officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for violating the 94th and 97th Articles of War in connection with the shooting on March 18, 1968, of Muslim recruits undergoing commando training on Corregidor.
Prior to the court-martial, on March 23, 1968, a complaint for frustrated murder was filed in the fiscal’s office of Cavite City by Jibin Anula, who claimed to have been wounded in the incident.
A jurisdictional issue arose regarding whether the general court-martial, convened on April 6, 1968, had acquired jurisdiction despite the previously filed complaint. This was resolved on June 23, 1969, when the Court ruled in favor of the military court’s jurisdiction over the case.

After the jurisdiction question was settled and trial proceedings resumed, petitioners raised concerns about the fairness of the trial.
Specifically, at the hearing on August 12, 1969, petitioner Martelino moved for the disqualification of the court-martial’s president after the latter admitted to reading newspaper accounts of the incident.
The petitioners argued that the heavy and politically charged media publicity surrounding the “Corregidor massacre” endangered their right to an impartial trial, especially given the significance of the upcoming presidential election on November 11, 1969.
The military court, however, denied the challenge against the court-martial president.

The petitioners simultaneously raised issues regarding peremptory challenges: they initially argued each accused should be permitted one challenge per specification, contending that the eleven charges entitled them to eleven peremptory challenges.
Subsequently, they adopted the view that while each accused might have one peremptory challenge for jointly tried specifications and one for common specifications, they were still entitled to a total of eleven challenges.
In contrast, the general court-martial maintained that since the charges were being tried jointly, all accused were entitled to only one peremptory challenge.

The petitioners sought certiorari and prohibition to nullify the orders of the court-martial denying both their peremptory challenges and challenges for cause.
They alleged that the intense, prejudicial publicity could unduly influence the members of the court-martial.
As a temporary measure, the Court had earlier issued a restraining order on the court-martial proceedings on August 29, 1969, pending resolution of these challenges.
The respondents (members of the court-martial) maintained that no substantial proof had been provided showing impaired impartiality, and that the trial would proceed fairly despite the publicity.

Whether the general court-martial committed a grave abuse of discretion in overruling the petitioners’ challenges for cause by failing to remedy the alleged prejudicial effects of extensive media publicity.

Does the evidence of widespread and politically motivated publicity amount to a sufficient basis to question the fairness of a court-martial trial?
To what extent does the suspension of proceedings satisfactorily address potential biases induced by the media coverage?

The proper interpretation and application of Article of War 18 regarding peremptory challenges.

Is each accused entitled to one peremptory challenge irrespective of the number of charges or the manner in which the charges are specified (jointly or commonly tried)?
How should the phrase “each side” in Article of War 18 be interpreted in the context of military jurisprudence and the rights of the accused?

Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy to challenge the court-martial’s orders in view of concurrent internal remedies available within the military justice system.