G.R. No. 1786 - Mattie E. Levy, administratrix of the estate of Samuel J. Levy vs. L. M. Johnson, W. A. Whaley, Paul Blum, and Henry Blum

Imelda R. Marcos (petitioner) and Jose P. Dans, Jr. (co-accused) served as ex officio Chair and Vice-Chair, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA).
Indicted under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for conspiring to enter a manifestly and grossly disadvantageous Lease Agreement on or about June 8, 1984.

Lease Agreement (Exh. “B”): LRTA leased 7,340 sqm in Pasay City to the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI) for ₱102,760/month over 25 years; signed by Dans for LRTA and Marcos for PGHFI.
Sublease Agreement (Exh. “D”): PGHFI subleased the same lot to Transnational Construction Corporation (TNCC) for ₱734,000/month over 25 years; signed by Marcos for PGHFI and TNCC’s president.

First Division (Justices Garchitorena, Balajadia, Atienza) failed to reach a unanimous vote.
Presiding Justice Garchitorena formed a five-member Special Division (Adm. Order No. 288-93); dissolved it (Adm. Order No. 293-93) after an informal lunch meeting of three justices.
On September 24, 1993, the reconstituted First Division convicted both Marcos and Dans.

On January 29, 1998, the Third Division affirmed Marcos’s conviction (G.R. No. 126995) but reversed Dans’s (G.R. No. 127073), relying mainly on the rental disparity.
Marcos filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MFR), raising (a) lack of proof she acted as a public officer; (b) insufficient evidence of gross disadvantage; (c) due process violations; and (d) right to speedy disposition.
The Court en banc heard oral arguments on September 10, 1998, and invited memoranda.

Did Marcos “enter, on behalf of the Government,” into the Lease Agreement as required by Sec. 3(g), RA 3019?

Did the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Lease Agreement was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government?

Were Marcos’s rights violated by the irregular formation and premature dissolution of the Special Division in the Sandiganbayan?

Would remanding the case for a new decision violate Marcos’s constitutional right to a speedy disposition of her case?