G.R. No. 46490 - Marcos vs. Cruz

The petitioners are Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo, with Ferdinand Marcos also mentioned in connection with a separate bail determination.
They are charged with the murder of Julio Nalundasan, a representative-elect for the second district of Ilocos Norte.
The murder is alleged to have occurred on or about the night of September 20, 1935, in Batac, Ilocos Norte, with the accused acting in concert, armed with firearms, and committing the act with treachery, evident premeditation, and specific intent to kill.
Aggravating circumstances include the commission of the crime at night and inside the victim’s residence.

On December 7, 1938, the provincial fiscal of Laguna (assigned to Ilocos Norte) filed an information charging the accused with murder.
The information included details of the crime, citing that evidence—and testimony from prosecution witnesses (notably Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio)—indicated the crime had indeed been committed by the accused.
Based on the testimonies, the respondent judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused on the same day, despite the accused not being present during the investigation.
The judge considered the crime a capital offense, thereby justifying his decision to hold the accused in detention due to the view that the proof of guilt was evident and the presumption of guilt strong.

On December 8, 1938, Mariano Marcos filed a motion to be admitted to bail.
Subsequently, on December 12, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo also moved for bail.
A supplementary motion for bail was filed on December 21, 1938, accompanied by sworn statements (marked A, B, C, and D) in which Mariano Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo denied the imputation of guilt and contested the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
These bail motions were heard by Judge Roman A. Cruz, with the fiscal arguing that the accused were not entitled to bail under the exception provided by Section 1, paragraph 16, Article III of the Constitution and Section 63 of General Orders, No. 58 due to the capital nature of the offense.
The defense, however, contended that since the exception is applicable only after the prosecution proves its case, the burden should lie upon the prosecution to demonstrate that the accused fell within the exception disqualifying them from bail.

The respondent judge initially denied the bail motions on December 29, 1938, ruling that because the witnesses’ testimony (taken in the absence of the accused) established the crime as capital with evident proof and a strong presumption of guilt, the accused were not entitled to bail.
The denial solidified the issue of whether the burden of proof to establish the non-bailability of an accused charged with a capital offense lay on the prosecution or the accused.
The subsequent controversy led the petitioners to seek certiorari (and, to a lesser extent, prohibition) against the respondent judge’s order.

Whether, in cases involving capital offenses, the burden is on the accused to prove their entitlement to bail or on the prosecution to prove that the exception applies.
Whether the filing of an information automatically establishes a presumption of guilt that would justify denying bail.

The admissibility and weight of evidence (testimony from prosecution witnesses taken in the absence of the accused) in establishing that the crime was capital, with strong presumption of guilt.
Whether the investigative procedure employed (with the accused absent during the witness testimony) amounts to a proper preliminary investigation for the purposes of determining bailability.

The meaning and operational application of Section 1, paragraph 16, Article III of the Constitution and Section 63 of General Orders, No. 58 concerning the right to bail prior to conviction.
How the judicial discretion granted by these provisions should be exercised when faced with the question of bailability in capital cases.