G.R. No. L-4663 - Marcos vs. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines

Two special civil actions for mandamus were filed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and Manuel Concordia.
The petitioners challenged the exclusion imposed by respondents—General Court-Martials composed of different officers of the Philippine Army—alleging that they were unlawfully deprived of the right to appear as counsel for the accused in military tribunals.

The petitioners, who are attorneys duly admitted to practice law in the Philippine Courts, contended that they should be allowed to represent the accused in courts-martial.
They argued that their exclusion violated their right to counsel because they were not properly given the opportunity to appear before the tribunals.

The controversy centered on Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution which states:

“No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted to the Congress during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.”

The petitioners claimed that this provision was applied unlawfully to bar them from representing the accused, despite their qualifications as lawyers.

The respondents, represented by various members or officers of the Philippine Army's military tribunals, enforced the constitutional barring as a valid ground to disqualify the petitioners from appearing as counsel.
They maintained that the exclusion was consistent with the constitutional prohibition to ensure that members of Congress do not participate in criminal cases where the accused is a government employee accused of an offense related to his office.

Extensive legal reasoning was presented regarding the nature of “any court” as mentioned in the constitutional provision:

The Court emphasized that the term “any court” includes courts-martial, given that a court-martial is a military tribunal functioning as a criminal court.

American Jurisprudence texts, which assert that when words have both a restricted and general meaning, the general meaning prevails unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
Prior cases such as Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, where the scope of judicial and military courts was examined.
References to Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents which underline the role, jurisdiction, and character of courts-martial as true courts of justice even though they are an instrumentality of the executive branch.

The discussion also referenced U.S. cases (e.g., In re Bogart, In re Davison, and Grafton vs. United States) to reinforce that courts-martial are legitimate forums for adjudicating criminal offenses, similar to civil courts.

The primary issue was whether Section 17, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applied to the petitioners, thereby disqualifying them from appearing as counsel in criminal cases, including those before courts-martial.

Another central issue was the interpretation of the term “any court” used in the prohibition:

Does “any court” extend to military tribunals such as the court-martial?
Should a court-martial, despite its military character, be deemed equivalent to a civil criminal court for purposes of this constitutional provision?

The controversy also involved determining whether the nature and jurisdiction of a court-martial qualify it as a “court” in the same sense as those used in criminal prosecutions in the civilian sphere.
Whether the inherent characteristics of a court-martial, being strictly limited to the military context, affect the application of the constitutional bar against certain attorneys.