G.R. No. 233846 - Spouses Cabasal vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.

Petitioner: Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), a private electric service provider.
Respondents:

Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), the specialized agency with regulatory and adjudicatory functions over the energy sector.
Edgar L. Ti, doing business as ELT Enterprise, a consumer of electric service.

Edgar L. Ti filed a verified complaint before the ERB alleging that MERALCO unlawfully disconnected part of the electric service at his business establishment in Little Baguio, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Ti contended that three electric meters were seized on mere suspicion of tampering, and the notice and execution of disconnection were improperly effected during unmonitored hours, thereby causing him irreparable damage.

On October 18, 1999, Ti initiated a complaint (ERB Case No. 99-67) alleging improper disconnection and unauthorized seizure of electric meters.
Included in his allegations was the claim that the disconnection notice was served at night and executed in the absence of either himself or a duly authorized representative.

On October 22, 1999, the ERB, acting on its authority, issued an order granting provisional relief by directing MERALCO to reconnect the electric service while the dispute was pending a full hearing.
This order was grounded on the consumer’s need for a speedy and adequate remedy as provided under the applicable laws.

On October 29, 1999, MERALCO moved for reconsideration of the provisional order, alleging that an inspection by its service inspectors and accompanying Philippine National Police personnel had found tampering with the electric meters.
Argued that the alleged tampering constituted a violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7832, thereby justifying an immediate disconnection without recourse to an administrative order for reconnection.

MERALCO contended that the ERB lacked the authority to issue a provisional order for reconnection because there was no express provision in Executive Order (E.O.) No. 172 granting adjudicative jurisdiction over such cases; that role, it argued, was reserved for the regular courts.
Subsequently, MERALCO also filed a motion for dismissal of Ti’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

MERALCO pursued a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), challenging the ERB orders on the grounds of alleged jurisdictional overreach and grave abuse of discretion.
The CA, in its decision dated September 22, 2000, affirmed the ERB’s orders and upheld its jurisdiction, thereby rejecting the petitioner's contentions.

The evolution of regulatory agencies is traced from the Board of Rate Regulation (BRR) to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners (BPUC), then to the Public Service Commission (PSC) under Commonwealth Act No. 146, and later to the Board of Energy (BOE) before its reconstitution into the ERB by E.O. No. 172.
Key provisions of the Public Service Act (C.A. No. 146) and R.A. No. 7832 are highlighted to establish the legal basis for the ERB’s authority over both regulatory and adjudicatory matters in the electric power industry.

The ERB’s power to grant provisional relief is supported not only by its enabling executive order (E.O. No. 172) but also by the continuing effect of statutory provisions involving the regulation and supervision of public utilities.
The complaint for reconnection, being a civil relief measure, is conceptually and legally distinct from any concurrent criminal proceedings initiated by MERALCO.

Whether the ERB has the statutory and inherent authority to adjudicate cases involving complaints for reconnection of electric service, particularly in scenarios alleging violations of R.A. No. 7832.
Whether the allegations contained in Ti’s complaint properly invoke the ERB’s supervisory and investigatory functions over public utilities as carried over from the Public Service Act and related regulations.

Whether the ERB’s order granting an immediate provisional reconnection of electric service, pending the resolution of the substantive issue, falls within its authority to grant provisional relief under its enabling rules.
Whether such administrative action is analogous to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which under MERALCO’s argument, should exclusively be within the purview of the regular courts.

Whether Section 6 of R.A. No. 7832, allowing for immediate disconnection without a court or administrative order, conflicts with the ERB’s exercise of provisional relief ordering a reconnection.
Whether the statute’s reference to “administrative order” implicitly recognizes the power of administrative bodies like the ERB to also restore service pending further investigation.