G.R. No. 152457 - Mahinay vs. Court of Appeals

On June 10, 1998, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), through its Officer-in-Charge Jesus S. Sirios, charged petitioner Rodolfo R. Mahinay, alleging that in the course of his official duties he received unofficial fees from FRITZ Logistics Phils., Inc.
The charge stemmed from petitioner’s alleged acceptance of an extra amount (P300.00) per escort duty performed for FRITZ trucks moving between Baguio City and Manila.
The allegations were grounded on the violation of Sec. 46(b)(9) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 22(i), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, contending that such receipt of fees was done in connection with his official duties.

The formal charge detailed that from 1996 until the issuance of a February 19, 1998 directive by P/Major Jose C. Panopio, petitioner engaged in receiving unofficial fees—even though the directive later explicitly prohibited such practices by all BCEZ police officers.
The allegation emphasized that the extra fee was obtained by petitioner's deliberate act of facilitating the smooth passage of FRITZ trucks amid police checkpoints and traffic enforcers, specifically during the implementation of the truck ban policy in Metro Manila.

In his Answer, petitioner admitted to the receipt of the P300 fee but maintained that it was originally offered by FRITZ Logistics as a traveling and meal allowance intended to offset the escort’s incidental expenses.
He explained that the escort duty’s primary purpose was to ensure that freight trucks safely and punctually reached their destinations, with the extra fee being an incidental matter.
Petitioner clarified that following the directive of SPL. P/Major Panopio, he instructed his men to cease accepting the additional allowance, thereby implying no ongoing improper conduct.

At the September 30, 1998 hearing, petitioner appeared with counsel and, by submitting a written waiver, effectively relinquished his right to be present and heard.
The Special Prosecutor presented Mr. Jerry H. Stehmeier, managing director of FRITZ, as the lone witness, whose testimony—a recantation of his earlier statement in a February 10, 1998 letter—admitted that petitioner actively extracted the extra P300 fee from FRITZ.
Mr. Stehmeier confirmed that before the issuance of the February 19, 1998 directive, it was customary for all BCEZ police officers to receive the additional P300, which later ceased per the directive.

On January 8, 1999, PEZA rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense and imposed the penalty of forced resignation, subject to the rules on monetary and fringe benefits.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before PEZA was denied on March 11, 1999.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), where Resolution No. 000878 dated March 30, 2000, upheld the PEZA decision but modified the penalty from forced resignation to dismissal from service pursuant to the applicable civil service rules.
A subsequent CSC motion for reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 001698 dated July 21, 2000.

On September 12, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, requesting a period up to November 10, 2000.
On October 30, 2000, the CA issued a resolution denying the motion on two grounds: it was the wrong mode of appeal and it was filed out of time. The CA pointed out that, as the decision was rendered by a quasi-judicial body, the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which must be filed within 15 days from notice of the decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed his petition for certiorari on November 9, 2000.
Further CA resolutions on April 6, 2001, and March 6, 2002, denied his motions for reconsideration and confirmed that the appeal was filed out of time, thereby effectively dismissing his petition for certiorari.

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by dismissing petitioner’s appeal for certiorari on the following grounds:

That the petition was filed using the wrong mode of appeal instead of the proper petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
That the appeal was filed out of time, considering the reglementary 15-day period from the notice of the decision.
Whether petitioner’s contention that the available appeal remedy under Rule 43 was inadequate—given that his dismissal had taken effect months earlier—was tenable.