G.R. No. L-9136 - LVM Transportation Company and Lorenzo Catalan vs. Hon. Enrique A. Ferdez, Judge of the Court of 1st Instance of Davao, and Standard Vacuum Oil Company

A money judgment was rendered in favor of Standard Vacuum Oil Company in Civil Case No. 1149 before the Court of First Instance of Davao.
The judgment pertained to claims against the defendants LVM Transportation Company and Lorenzo Catalan, petitioners in the present case.

On January 3, 1955, following the money judgment, Standard Vacuum Oil Company filed a motion for immediate execution of the judgment.
The petitioners opposed this motion and promptly filed their notice of appeal, accompanied by an appeal bond and the record on appeal, on January 11, 1955.
The hearing on the record on appeal was scheduled for January 15, 1955.
At the scheduled hearing, no appearance was made on behalf of the plaintiff, and no objections were raised regarding the record on appeal.
Consequently, the lower court approved the record on appeal on January 15, 1955.

On January 28, 1955, despite the approval of the record on appeal, the trial court granted the motion for immediate execution without requiring the filing of a bond by the plaintiff.
On February 10, 1955, the defendants requested a reconsideration of the immediate execution order, claiming that the trial court had already lost jurisdiction following the approval of the record on appeal.
In response, the plaintiff countered with a motion to set aside the order approving the record on appeal. The plaintiff argued that the order was rendered by mistake, as the court had not taken into account its request for postponing the hearing and that the motion for immediate execution was still pending resolution.
On March 2, 1955, the trial court issued an order allowing the immediate execution order to stand while setting aside the earlier order approving the record on appeal.

The defendants (Standard Vacuum Oil Company) filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion by authorizing immediate execution without bond after it had ostensibly lost jurisdiction.
They sought the annulment of the order that set aside the record on appeal and granted immediate execution, as well as an injunction against its enforcement.

Whether, upon approval of the record on appeal pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 41, the trial court had already lost jurisdiction over the case.
Whether the issuance of an order for immediate execution by the trial court, after the record on appeal had been approved, was beyond its jurisdiction.

Whether the immediate execution order, which was granted without requiring the filing of an appeal bond, constituted an abuse of discretion given that it was issued after the appellate procedure had been perfected.
Whether the exception under Section 9 of Rule 41 allowing orders “for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties” applied to an order for immediate execution.

Whether the premature approval of the record on appeal, despite the plaintiff’s request for postponement, is a harmless error given that no substantial prejudice was alleged.
Whether the technical omission regarding the furnishing of a copy of the appeal bond to the plaintiff had any bearing on the case.