Title
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case
G.R. No. 72645
Decision Date
Jun 30, 1987
A final 1967 judgment for P20,000 was revived in 1974 but unenforced. Claim filed in 1982 against Gil Puyat’s estate was barred by prescription, as the 10-year period began in 1967, not 1974. SC affirmed dismissal.
A

Case Digest (G.R. No. 72645)

Facts:

Luzon Surety Company, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72645, June 30, 1987, Supreme Court Second Division, Gutierrez, Jr., J., writing for the Court.

Petitioner Luzon Surety Company, Inc. sought review of the decision and resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 03693, which had affirmed the trial court's dismissal of petitioner’s claim against the estate of Gil Puyat and others. Respondents include members of the Puyat family who opposed enforcement of the judgments.

The antecedent litigation began in Civil Case No. 59506 (Court of First Instance of Manila), in which judgment was rendered against several defendants, including Gil Puyat, for P20,000 plus interest and P3,608 for premiums and stamps; that judgment became final on April 13, 1967 but was not executed. Within the prescriptive period, petitioner brought Civil Case No. 93268 to revive the original judgment; the CFI rendered a revived judgment on May 24, 1974 (dispositive portion ordering payment of the principal, interest and unpaid premiums/stamps). That revived judgment became final in 1974 and remained unenforced.

Gil Puyat died on March 28, 1981. On September 1, 1982, petitioner filed a claim against his estate in Special Proceedings No. Q-32291 (Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII) for P178,507.76 (including interest, unpaid premiums and attorney’s fees) as of June 25, 1982. The estate administrators opposed the claim, arguing it was unenforceable and barred by laches because no execution was sought during the decedent’s lifetime.

On November 8, 1983 the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch LXXXVIII, dismissed petitioner’s claim. On appeal, the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the ten-year prescriptive period of Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code is counted from the finality of the original judgment (April 13, 1967), not from the finality of the revived judgment; thus petitioner’s September 1, 1982 claim was time-barred. The Appellate Court relied on the Court’s jurisprudence, particularly ...(Subscriber-Only)

Issues:

  • Did the respondents waive the defense of prescription by failing to raise it in their comment to the claim?
  • Does the ten-year prescriptive period under Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code commence from the finality of the original judgment or from the finality of a revived judgment, and was petitioner’s claim filed on Sept...(Subscriber-Only)

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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