G.R. No. L-2660 - Luzon Marine Department Union vs. Roldan

On June 17, 1948, the petitioner, Luzon Marine Department Union—a duly registered labor union—submitted a petition to Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc. comprising twelve demands, including one for full recognition with the right to collective bargaining, a closed-shop arrangement, and checkoff.
On June 21, 1948, the petitioner initiated legal proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations, praying that the respondent company be directed to immediately comply with all the demands contained in its petition.

The Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (U.O.E.F.), a labor organization representing about 75,000 members and having various units including the Universal Marine Union, intervened in the case.
U.O.E.F. contended that the petitioner’s demand for recognition would violate a prior agreement made in early 1947 between the respondent company and U.O.E.F., wherein the company had acknowledged U.O.E.F. as the exclusive labor organization with rights for collective bargaining and a closed-shop provision.
U.O.E.F. moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioner did not have more than thirty members employed by the company, a jurisdictional requirement.
The motion for dismissal was heard on July 7, 10, and 12, 1948, and on July 19, 1948, Judge Jose S. Bautista ruled against the dismissal motion and declared that the court had jurisdiction over the matter.

On the morning of July 19, 1948, before receiving notice of the court’s ruling, 65 alleged members of the petitioner failed to report for work without notifying the company, effectively initiating a strike.

In response, the foreman of the respondent’s Towing Department requested U.O.E.F. to provide replacement labor, which was promptly accommodated.

On July 21, 1948, at 8:15 a.m., the general manager of the respondent received a mailed notice from the petitioner, informing him that the 65 employees had struck at 6 a.m. on July 19.
The petitioner, on July 20, 1948, filed another petition before the Court of Industrial Relations alleging that over 300 members had joined the strike in protest of the company’s refusal to meet their demands and the contention over the number of union members employed.
This petition sought a restraining order preventing the respondent from hiring strike-breakers.
The respondent company and U.O.E.F. opposed this petition, leading to judicial proceedings that resulted in an order on August 16, 1948, by Associate Judge Jose S. Bautista directing the strikers to return to work and the company to reinstate their positions.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent company and the intervener U.O.E.F. The court, sitting in banc (with Judge Bautista dissenting), set aside the initial order and declared the strike illegal and unjustified.

Whether a strike initiated during the pendency of a petition for the settlement of an industrial dispute is legal when the court has not enjoined the striking employees.
Whether the petitioner’s unilateral decision to strike, without waiting for the court’s resolution on the jurisdictional issue concerning union membership, constituted justifiable action.

Whether the motives cited—the desire to show the company and U.O.E.F. that the petitioner had more than thirty members and the alleged threat by Alejo Villanueva to dismiss workers—legitimize the declaration of a strike.
Whether resorting to a strike to force an early resolution or to pre-empt evidence in court is a permissible and lawful tactic under the established legal framework.

How the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103—which restrict strikes pending a court's award or decision—apply in cases where no injunction against striking is explicitly issued.
Whether previous rulings, such as in Rex Taxicab Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc. vs. Philippine Match Company, support the conclusion that a strike for trivial or coercive purposes is illegal.