Case Digest (A.M. No. MTJ-92-643)
Facts:
Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Judge Francisco Diaz Villanueva, A.C. No. MTJ-92-643, November 27, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc, Campos, Jr., J., writing for the Court.The complainant was Louis Vuitton, S.A.; the respondent was Judge Francisco Diaz Villanueva, Presiding Judge, Branch 36, Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) at Quezon City. The administrative complaint charged the respondent judge under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment in a criminal prosecution.
The underlying criminal case was Criminal Case No. XXXVI-62431, People of the Philippines v. Jose V. Rosario, in which Rosario was prosecuted for unfair competition under paragraph 1 of Article 189, Revised Penal Code. The information alleged that Rosario, as owner/proprietor of Manila COD Department Store, manufactured, distributed and sold leather goods bearing the Louis Vuitton marks and logos. Prosecution evidence included two test purchases by a witness (Miguel Domingo), and an NBI search on September 28, 1989 that resulted in seizure of about seventy-two (72) leather articles; the accused signed the inventory with the notation “owner/representative.”
At trial the accused contended he was not the manufacturer or seller; the seized items were sold by a concessionaire, Erlinda Tan (Hi‑Tech Bags and Wallets), and Rosario was a stockholder and Executive Vice‑President of Rosario Bros., Inc., which operates COD. The prosecution filed a Prosecution’s Memorandum with Motion (February 8, 1991) asking for a conviction, and alternatively moving that the accused be committed to answer for the offense of “giving other persons a chance or opportunity to commit unfair competition” under Section 1, Article 189 and Rule 119, Sec. 11 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The MTC acquitted Rosario. The trial court found the prosecution failed to prove ownership or control of the seized items by Rosario, observed the inventory form bore a preprinted “owner/representative” entry, and relied on the appearance, price tags (far below genuine Louis Vuitton prices), poor workmanship (including mixed brand buckles), and other indicia to conclude the articles would not deceive the ordinary purchaser. The trial court also noted that Rosario was charged individually whereas COD was a corporation with separate personality and that the prosecution did not prove Rosario’s corporate authority to bind the corporation.
Louis Vuitton, S.A. filed an administrative complaint against Judge Villanueva alleging (a) omission to consider the prosecution’s motions (Feb. 8 and Feb. 11, 1991) thereby allowing the accused to escape liability (arguing Section 11, Rule 119 required commitment for proper information), (b) erroneous application or disregard of authorities such as Converse Rubber Corp. v. Jacinto Rubber & Plastics Co., Inc., (c) failure to find the defense witness not credible, and (d) delay in promulgation of judgment (decision dated June 28, 1991 but promulgated October 25, 1991), contrary to the constitutional right to speedy disposition.
Respondent Judge Villanueva answered that (1) the prosecution’s evidence was inadequate to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) the prosecutor never pointed out a mistake in the charge before judgment; (3) the private prosecutor’s memorandum...(Subscriber-Only)
Issues:
- Did Judge Francisco Diaz Villanueva knowingly render a manifestly unjust judgment in violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code?
- Was the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable to infer bad faith/malice from the face of the assailed decision?
- Did the delay in promulgation of the decision warra...(Subscriber-Only)
Ruling:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Ratio:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Doctrine:
- (Subscriber-Only)