Facts:
On April twenty-nine, nineteen hundred seven, the plaintiff
Lo Po filed in this court, as an original action, a petition for the writ of
habeas corpus, seeking the production before the court of the person of
Lo Toe and requiring the defendant
H. B. McCoy to show cause why Lo Toe was being detained. On the same day, the court issued the writ directed to the defendant. On May two, nineteen hundred seven, the defendant produced Lo Toe and presented reasons for the detention. On May three, nineteen hundred seven, the parties filed an agreed stipulation of facts stating that Lo Toe was born in the Empire of China twenty years earlier; that he and his parents at birth were subjects of the Emperor of China and persons of
Chinese race and descent; that Lo Toe had never been in the Philippine Islands before the present attempt to enter; and that his father,
Lo San, had entered the Philippine Islands twenty-four years earlier and had maintained a continuous residence there, subject only to periodical and temporary returns to China. The stipulation further stated that Lo San, as a merchant, had established his immigration status in a manner found satisfactory by immigration officers at the port of Manila. It was agreed that Lo San had been examined by a medical officer of the United States Marine-Hospital Service, who certified that Lo San suffered from
trachoma, described as a loathsome, dangerous, and contagious disease, and that a
board of special inquiry had rejected Lo San based on that certificate. It was also agreed that Lo Toe, when examined by the board of special inquiry, was rejected on the theory that his right to enter depended upon the right of his father to land, and that because Lo San had no right to enter, Lo Toe likewise had none. The stipulation added that Lo Toe had no certificate identifying him and evidencing permission under section 6 of the Act of Congress of May 6, 1882, as amended by the Act of July 5, 1884, nor any other documentary proof of a right to enter, and that unless the facts constituted an abuse of authority, no immigration officer acted improperly in the cases of both Lo San and Lo Toe. The parties stipulated that the board’s decision on Lo San and Lo Toe was made on April twenty-five, nineteen hundred seven; that notice of that decision was communicated to Lo Toe on the same date; that Lo Toe was informed of his right to appeal within five days under immigration regulations (Chinese and immigration circular No. 186, 5 Off. Gaz., 290); that an attorney appeared at the board’s office around April twenty or twenty-seven and announced intention to appeal, but no written appeal was ever taken. Finally, the stipulation stated that the admission that the boy was a minor was for purposes of the case only because the board expressed an opinion that he was not a minor, and that if the court decided Lo Toe should not be deported, the matter should be remanded to the board to determine the issue of minority. After a vacation judge referred the questions because of their importance to the Supreme Court, the case was presented to the Supreme Court on July thirteen, nineteen hundred seven, on the basis of the agreed statement of facts.
Issues:
Whether the petition for
habeas corpus could be entertained to override the board of special inquiry’s determination that Lo Toe should be detained and deported due to Lo San’s inability to enter, in light of the alleged finality of immigration administrative decisions and the petitioner’s failure to exhaust the available executive remedies by filing a timely appeal.
Ruling:
Ratio:
Doctrine: