G.R. No. 96914 - Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma is the owner-lessor of an apartment building located at 800-802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila.
Two units within the building were leased to the private respondent at monthly rental rates of P3,450.00 for the unit at 800 Remedios Street and P2,300.00 for the unit at 802 Remedios Street.
The original lease agreement was formalized on December 10, 1984, and, except for alterations in rates and duration, was impliedly renewed on a month-to-month basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code.

Private respondent failed to pay the monthly rental, resulting in arrears totalling P14,039.00 as of October 31, 1988.
Letters of demand were issued and received; however, the non-payment persisted.
Petitioner initiated a barangay conciliation proceeding in accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, wherein her son Raymond U. Ledesma assisted her due to her recurring psychological and emotional ailment.
The barangay eventually issued a Certification to File Action, although questions were later raised regarding the manner of this certification’s issuance.

The Manila Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 10, issued a decision on June 21, 1989:

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, affirmed the MTC decision but reduced the attorney’s fees to P1,000.00.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s ruling and dismissed petitioner’s ejectment complaint for lack of cause of action on the ground of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508.

Private respondent argued that petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 6 (requiring a prior conciliation process with personal confrontation) and Section 9 (mandating personal appearance in the proceedings) of P.D. 1508.
Petitioner contended that the issue of non-compliance was improperly raised for the first time on appeal and that its non-raising at the trial level precluded its consideration.
Evidence showed that demand letters and the Certification to File Action were executed by petitioner’s son and counsel rather than by petitioner herself, highlighting the failure to meet the personal appearance requirement.

The petitioner argued that her failure to personally appear before the barangay Lupon was due to her recurring psychological problems—a claim not substantiated during the period in question.
The private respondent maintained that his Answer in the trial court clearly raised the issue of non-compliance with P.D. 1508, contesting:

The alleged irregularities in the barangay proceedings.
The improper issuance of the Certification to File Action.
His contention that he was not summoned or subpoenaed, and thus did not have the opportunity for personal confrontation.

The Court of Appeals, affirming sentiments from previous jurisprudence (such as in Saludes vs. Pajarillo and Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court), held that raising the issue at the appellate level was proper once essentially raised in the lower court.

Whether the ejectment complaint could validly proceed despite the alleged non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, specifically Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508.

Can a complaint still be entertained when the petitioner fails to meet the personal appearance and conciliation requirements?
Is the non-compliance fatal to the cause of action in an ejectment proceeding?

Whether the private respondent properly raised the issue of non-compliance in the lower courts and whether he waived his right to raise such issue later on appeal.

Did the issues regarding non-summons and the improper issuance of the Certification to File Action sufficiently constitute a waiver by the private respondent?
Can such objections be raised for the first time on appeal if not litigated in the trial court?

Whether the alleged psychological condition of the petitioner provided a justifiable excuse for non-compliance with the personal appearance requirement mandated by Section 9 of P.D. 1508.

Was the petitioner’s claim of recurring psychological and emotional ailment adequately corroborated by evidence during the period relevant to the proceedings?
Does the law allow representation by a proxy (such as a son or counsel) in lieu of personal appearance under the strict construction of Section 9?

Whether the lower courts’ decisions, including the reversal of ejectment rulings, were in proper accord with established legal principles on waiver, compliance, and statutory interpretation.