G.R. No. 38046 - Lagrimas vs. Director of Prisons

The petitioner, Eustaquio Lagrimas, was detained in the Bilibid Prison and filed a petition for his release.
He argued for his liberation by invoking Article 149 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes a lighter penalty compared to that provided under the old Penal Code.
The petitioner had been previously sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Samar to two years, eleven months, and eleven days of prision correctional, plus a fine of 375 pesetas, pursuant to Article 251 of the old Penal Code.

The factual incident involved the petitioner slapping and using offensive language toward Mamerta Alcazar, a public school teacher in Laoang, Samar, while she was performing her official duties.
He was charged with assault upon a public official, where the evidence established that the assault was committed by laying hands on a person coming to the aid of the authorities—a conduct penalized under Article 251 of the old Penal Code.
The case involved contrasting legal interpretations regarding which Revised Penal Code provision (Article 148 vs. Article 149) was applicable to his offense.

The jurisprudence provides a comparative reading between the old Penal Code (Articles 250 and 251) and the Revised Penal Code (Articles 148 and 149):

Under the old Penal Code, Article 250 and Article 251 distinguish between assaults committed under certain aggravating circumstances (such as brandishing a weapon, or assaulting government employees/public officials or their aides).
In the Revised Penal Code, Article 148 deals with direct assaults (i.e., employing force or intimidation against a person in authority or his agents) while Article 149 covers indirect assaults (i.e., making use of force or intimidation upon persons coming to the aid of authorities).

The court highlighted that although Articles 251 (old) and 149 (new) are analogous in addressing assault on persons coming to the aid of authorities, the Revised Penal Code does not include provisions penalizing assault on agents of authority or public officials under Article 149.

The petitioner raised the issue by invoking Article 149 of the Revised Penal Code, arguing that the new code imposed a lesser penalty, thereby warranting his release.
The Director of Prisons, on the other hand, maintained that Article 148 was applicable and that his offense, as defined under the old Penal Code and affirmed by the trial court, should continue to be enforced under its original penalties.
The controversy centered on whether the petitioner, sentenced under the old Penal Code, could benefit from the more lenient provisions (or even the eliminatory effect) of the Revised Penal Code, particularly under the retroactivity clause in Article 22.

Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code was cited to emphasize that felonies and misdemeanors committed before the enactment of the new code are to be punished according to the laws then in force.
The petitioner’s reliance on Article 22, which favours retroactive application of penal laws when beneficial to the offender, was countered by the majority, who noted that Article 366 ensures continuation of the old penalties.

The majority opinion denied the petition on the ground that the petitioner must serve his sentence as imposed under the old Penal Code since no retroactive relief is provided when the new law does not expressly mitigate the offense.
A dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Avancena argued that the remedy should be granted based on the retroactive favourability of Article 22, maintaining that the revised law’s view of the act renders it either less serious or not criminal at all.

Whether the petitioner's offense, committed under the old Penal Code (Article 251), should be reclassified for the purpose of applying the more lenient provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Is Article 149, which provides a lighter penalty, applicable instead of Article 148 in this case?

Whether the retroactive application of more lenient penal provisions under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code should benefit the petitioner.
Whether the legislative intent embodied in Article 366, ensuring that crimes committed prior to the new code’s effect are punished under the law in force at the time, prevents the extension of retroactive benefits.
Whether the petitioner's continued incarceration is justified despite the Revised Penal Code’s reclassification, which in some respects deems his conduct less serious or non-punishable.