G.R. No. L-6225 - Lacson vs. Roque

Mayor Lacson was suspended from office by the President on October 31, 1952, based on a policy of suspending any local elective official charged with an offense involving moral turpitude.
The suspension was effected following the filing of a criminal libel complaint by Judge Agustin P. Montesa against Lacson, rising from disparaging remarks made during a radio broadcast.

On October 20, 1952, after a controversial acquittal of Celestino C. Juan (Deputy Chief of Police), Lacson made a radio broadcast criticizing certain courts and, specifically, Judge Montesa by stating that, if given the power, he would fire the judge for incompetence and ignorance.
At a public meeting, Judge Montesa raised the issue of whether such remarks constituted contempt of court, prompting the formation of a committee that reported its apparent inability to comment conclusively on the viability of a contempt proceeding.

On October 23, Judge Montesa sought the designation of a special prosecutor to handle a pending libel action against Lacson, citing concerns of impartiality if the local City Fiscal were to be involved.
Subsequently, on October 24, the Secretary of Justice, through Special Administrative Order No. 235 (marked RUSH), appointed Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the complaint.
Without involving the designated Assistant Fiscals, Solicitor Vivo conducted a preliminary investigation, issued subpoenas, and on October 30, filed in the Court of First Instance a libel complaint against Lacson, supported by certifications that the investigation was conducted in accordance with law.

The Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Republic Act No. 409) provides that the Mayor shall hold office for four years “unless sooner removed.” However, it is silent on the specific grounds and procedure for removal or suspension, contrasting with explicit provisions for other city officials.
The administrative framework also includes Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, granting the President power to remove any person from a position of trust for disloyalty, thereby raising issues about the appropriate exercise of executive removal and suspension powers.
Lacson contested the legality of his suspension via an original action for prohibition, arguing that the alleged offense of libel did not fall under the grounds justifying suspension or removal from an elective post.

Does the President, under Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code and the constitutional provision of general supervision, have the power to suspend or remove the Mayor of Manila?
How should the phrase “unless sooner removed” in the Manila City Charter be interpreted in connection with the removal of an elective official?

Is the filing of a libel complaint—stemming from disparaging remarks made during a radio broadcast—sufficient legal ground to justify the suspension of the Mayor?
Can actions taken in a personal capacity, even if delivered from an official venue such as the City Hall, constitute misconduct in office warranting removal or suspension?

Were proper administrative procedures followed, particularly regarding notice and hearing, before suspending Mayor Lacson?
Does suspending an official solely on the basis of a pending criminal case (with no formal administrative charge or investigation) violate due process and principles safeguarding the tenure of elective officials?