A.C. No. 6490 - Tabang vs. Gacott

Petitioner: Cicero C. Jurado, serving as City Fiscal of Iligan City.
Respondent: Suy Yan alias James Yap, with Chao Ce alias Co Chiongtai as co-accused.

The information charged the accused with the crime of estafa (swindling) through fraudulent false pretenses.
Two distinct modes of committing estafa were specified in the information:

Falsely pretending to possess funds, property, credit, or business (under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)).
Postdating or issuing a check knowing there were insufficient funds (under Article 315, paragraph 2(d)).

The allegations detailed that the accused induced a business establishment (Dy Pico Sons) to deliver 25,000 bags of cement based on false representations.

The case originated in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte in Criminal Case No. 1395.
The accused filed a motion to quash on December 4, 1967, arguing that the information charged more than one offense by clearly enumerating two distinct elements of estafa.
The respondent fiscal, representing the People, countered the motion by asserting that the information charged a single offense of estafa, with the two fraudulent acts merely describing alternative means or essential elements of the one crime.

On December 15, 1967, the respondent fiscal filed an answer to the motion to quash.
After the arraignment on December 6, 1967, subsequent motions and a motion for reconsideration were filed by the accused and later opposed by the City Fiscal.
The respondent judge issued orders denying the motion to quash and later the motion for cancellation of the trial hearing.
On March 24, 1969, three members of the Court of Appeals Special Division of Five promulgated a resolution directing that the information be amended to charge only one offense by electing between the two alternative modes under Article 315, with dissenting opinions raised by two justices.

A petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction was eventually filed by the accused, challenging the orders of the lower courts and the decision of the Court of Appeals.
It was noted that the petitioner was technically the People of the Philippines, and the City Fiscal was acting in a counsel-like capacity, which was a formal error that did not affect the merits of the case.

Whether the allegation in the information, although describing two distinct fraudulent acts (falsely representing possession of funds and postdating checks), constitutes one single offense or two separate offenses of estafa.
Whether upon the denial of a motion to quash—an interlocutory order—the remedy of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction is proper, instead of proceeding directly to trial.
Whether the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation was violated by the language of the information, given that it lists alternative modes of committing the same offense.
Whether lower court and appellate procedural decisions (including orders on the motion to cancel the trial and the resolution for amendment of the information) acted within the bounds of jurisdiction and proper legal remedy.