Case Digest (G.R. No. L-4338)
Facts:
Alfred B. Jones, Petitioner, vs. J. E. Harding, Chief of the Manila Police, et al., G.R. No. 4338, December 02, 1907, the Supreme Court, Torres, J., writing for the Court; Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Willard, JJ., concur; Carson, J., and Tracey, J., dissenting.On an unstated day in December 1906, Mariano Cauilan, Francisco Cauilan, Maria Asuncion Maggay, and Maria Maggay (through their attorney in fact, Robert S. MacDougall) sold and conveyed to Fred. W. Prising eight-fifteenths of their interest in the hacienda "Calabbacao" (between Cordoba and Amulung, Province of Cagayan). The deed of sale was not entered in the registry of property. Until 22 March 1907, Domingo Maggay, who owned two-fifteenths of the undivided hacienda, had no knowledge of that sale.
On 25 April 1907 Domingo Maggay filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan invoking his right to redeem under article 1522 of the Civil Code; he sought that vendors and purchaser be ordered to state the terms, total price, expenses, and useful improvements, and that he be allowed to redeem and be subrogated to the purchaser’s conditions. Maggay alleged that when he attempted to learn the terms he encountered refusal: Prising would not disclose the contract, and the vendors professed ignorance of its terms.
While that action was pending, Maggay’s counsel sought to take depositions in Manila of witnesses including attorneys J. Courtney Hixson and Alfred B. Jones. The presiding judge in Part I of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Hon. Newton W. Gilbert, acted as commissioner deputed by the Cagayan judge to take the depositions. Prising had openly stated that three promissory notes signed by N. T. Hashim & Co., each for P30,000, had been delivered to Hixson and Jones for safekeeping and collection. When questioned separately, Hixson answered, but Jones refused to say whether he had received the notes, invoking the attorney-client privilege under section 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Judge Gilbert overruled Jones’s objection and ordered an answer. Jones persisted in refusing to answer and was, by the judge’s order dated 9 October, held guilty of contempt and ordered arrested until he answered. Jones then filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking release on grounds that the judge-commissioner exceeded his powers, that Jones was deprived of due process, and that the contempt had not been the subject of information or complaint.
The trial judge justified his action: as commissioner he had authority under sections 355, 356, 361, 366 and 408 of the Code of Civil Procedure to issue subpoenas, take testimony, and punish disobedience or refusal to answer as contempt; the judge found that any answer by Jones (affirmative or negative) would not disclose privileged communications and that refusal therefore constituted contempt punishable by imprisonment under secti...(Pro-only)
Issues:
- Did the commissioner (Judge Gilbert), deputed to take depositions, have jurisdiction to compel answers and to punish refusal as contempt so as to bar habeas corpus relief?
- Was Attorney Jones’s refusal to answer the question whether he had received the promissory notes protected by the attorney-client privilege under section 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
- If Jones was in contempt, was ordering his arrest and detention until he answered (an indeterminate imprisonment) a lawf...(Pro-only)
Ruling:
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Ratio:
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Doctrine:
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