G.R. No. 2486 - Joaquin vs. Avellano

On December 8, 1902, the plaintiff, Leocadio Joaquin, commenced an action against Tan Tongco to recover the sum of 2,000 pesos.
On December 11, 1902, a writ of attachment was issued in that action and was duly levied upon the property described in the complaint of the present action—a leasehold interest in a tract of land in Calle Lemery, Tondo, Manila, including the building standing thereon.
The writ of attachment and its levy were annotated in the Registry of Property on December 15, 1902.

On February 26, 1903, final judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff against Tan Tongco for the recovery of 2,000 pesos with interest at 6% from September 2, 1902.
A writ of execution was issued on April 23, 1904, pursuant to which, on May 28, 1904, the sheriff sold the property attached. The property sold included the right, title, and interest that Tan Tongco had at the time of the attachment—or that which he might have acquired thereafter—to the plaintiff.
On July 14, 1904, the plaintiff presented a certificate of the sale to the registrar of property; however, on July 20, 1904, the registrar refused to inscribe the certificate for the house, basing the refusal on the fact that the house had been previously sold to and inscribed in favor of the defendant.

Prior to the sale by execution, on December 19, 1902, a judge of the Court of First Instance had appointed a receiver of all of Tan Tongco’s property; later, the receiver’s appointment was declared void in Blanco vs. Ambler.
Acting under court orders, the receiver sold the house in question to the defendant (Lamberto Avellano) on December 5, 1903.
The defendant, besides acquiring the house via the receiver’s sale, was also noted as the long-time owner of the land upon which the house stood.

The lower court found that the defendant had previously leased the land to Agustina Brillo, and that she had lost any interest under that lease prior to the attachment, with the defendant taking possession before the levy.
The evidence backing this finding was limited primarily to the defendant’s own testimony, in which he stated that he had purchased the land about ten years before and subsequently leased it to Agustina Brillo three years before the trial, noting that she had not paid the rental—prompting him to hire a lawyer to recover his money.
The factual matrix regarding the timing of the lease, the construction of the house, the marital status at the time of the lease or construction, and the continuity or forfeiture of the leasehold interest remains unclear.

Whether the sale of the house made by the receiver to the defendant was void due to the void appointment of the receiver and the prior attachment on the property.
Whether any sale or transfer executed by the receiver could confer an interest that might be free from the attachment executed against Tan Tongco’s property.

Whether the defendant’s acquisition, through the receiver’s sale, was subject to the plaintiff’s prior attachment and subsequent judicial sale.
Whether the property interest acquired by the plaintiff through the execution sale encompassed all rights held by Tan Tongco at the time of the attachment.

Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish what interest Tan Tongco had in the property at the time of the attachment.
Whether the alleged leasehold interest, including any rights arising from the purported lease to Agustina Brillo, was still valid or had been forfeited before the attachment or the receiver’s sale.