Title
Jaroda vs. Cusi, Jr.
Case
G.R. No. L-28214
Decision Date
Jul 30, 1969
A special administrator's unauthorized withdrawal of estate funds and self-appointment as attorney-in-fact were ruled void by the Supreme Court due to lack of notice to heirs and conflict of interest, affirming certiorari as the proper remedy.
A

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-28214)

Facts:

Natividad V. A. Jaroda v. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., et al., G.R. No. L-28214, promulgated July 30, 1969, Supreme Court En Banc, Reyes, J.B.L., writing for the Court. The petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction challenged two orders of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, in Special Proceeding No. 1391 (intestate estate of Carlos Villa Abrille): the 5 May 1965 order permitting withdrawal of bank deposits and the 3 September 1965 order approving a power of attorney authorizing the administrator to sell subdivision lots.

Petitioner Natividad V. A. Jaroda is an heir of the deceased Carlos Villa Abrille. Respondent Antonio V. A. Tan was appointed special administrator (26 April 1965) and later regular administrator of the intestate estate; respondent Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. was the presiding judge who signed the questioned orders. Tan petitioned the probate court on 22 April 1965 alleging intestacy and listing among the estate assets a 19% pro indiviso share in the Juna Subdivision and certain bank savings.

On 4 May 1965 Tan filed an ex parte motion to withdraw additional sums (P109,886.42 and P72,644.66) from the Philippine National Bank, claiming those deposits, though in the decedent’s name, were proceeds held in trust for co-owners of the Juna Subdivision; he annexed purported 1948–49 powers of attorney from co-owners authorizing Abrille to sell lots and deposit proceeds. The probate court found the petition “meritorious” and granted the withdrawal on 5 May 1965.

On 7 May 1965 Tan and other co-owners executed a power of attorney appointing Tan attorney‑in‑fact to sell the subdivision lots. Tan received letters of administration (9 September 1965) and filed as regular administrator a petition (dated the same day) seeking court approval of the power of attorney and authority to sell the estate’s pro‑rata share; the court granted the petition on 3 September 1965. Petitioner Jaroda did not concur in the ex parte withdrawal and later challenged both orders.

Jaroda moved to nullify the two orders on 29 November 1966; the probate court denied the motion for lack of merit on 25 February 1967 and dismissed her appeal as interlocutory. She filed an earlier certiorari/mandamus petition with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-27831, docketed 8 July 1967), which the Court dismissed and advised appeal in due time (resolution referred to as L‑27836). Thereafter Jaroda filed the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction (filed 28 October 1967); the Court gave due course and issued a preliminary injunction on 3 November 1967 restraining Tan from selling the estate’s share. The case was submitted and decided by the Court’s opinion of July 30, 1969.

Issues:

  • Was certiorari an appropriate remedy in the circumstances, despite the earlier dismissal of a prior petition and notwithstanding that appeal was available?
  • Did the Court of First Instance commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (a) allowing the special administrator to withdraw the bank deposits ex parte and (b) approving the power of attorney that appointed the administrator his own attorney‑in‑fact to sell the estate’s pro indiviso interest?

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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