G.R. No. 27296 - Intestate Estate of Banzon vs. Banzon

Plaintiff and Appellant: Trinidad Gonzalez, acting as the judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of Jose B. Banzon.
Defendants and Appellees: Mariano B. Banzon, Ursula Banzon, Alberto Aquino, and others implicated in the construction and use of the irrigation canals.

The controversy centers on two irrigation canals constructed across a tract of land owned by the intestate estate of Jose B. Banzon.
The alleged construction of the canals was carried out without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent.

In April 1919, defendants Mariano B. Banzon, Ursula Banzon, and Alberto Aquino are alleged to have opened a canal measuring 1,000 meters long, 2 meters wide, and 2 meters deep, traversing the land from east to west to divert water from the Talisay River for irrigating their lands.
In December 1922, the same defendants are alleged to have opened a second canal, almost parallel to the first, measuring 1,000 meters long, 3 meters wide, and 2 meters deep, on the north side of the first canal, again without the plaintiff’s consent.
Plaintiff claimed that the opening of these canals resulted in damage such as loss of crops, disintegration, and an unleveling of the land.
She sought an order directing the closure and refilling of the canals and a corresponding indemnification for the damages suffered.

The first canal was originally constructed in 1905 with the assistance of Jose B. Banzon and was maintained as part of an irrigation system (conduit No. 9) benefiting multiple landowners, including the deceased and his heirs.
Both the deceased and his heirs, along with the plaintiff, had derived benefits from this historic system.

The canal was constructed with the consent of his brother, Jose B. Banzon, and was located in the most convenient and least prejudicial area for third persons.
He further advanced a counterclaim seeking the right to continue the use of the said second canal by paying an appropriate indemnity.

Documentary evidence, including the cadastral survey (Exhibit B) and the original certificate of Torrens title (No. 2502), was considered; the latter did not show any notation of an easement of aqueduct on lot No. 362.

Section 39 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2011, which provides that any easement (or other right) not stated in the certificate of Torrens title is subject to extinguishment once the servient estate is registered.
Distinction between two kinds of easements:

Voluntary easements, which are subject to registration notation.
Legal (compulsory) easements, which arise by operation of law but were discussed as not being in issue here.

Article 557 and Article 558 provide for a compulsory easement of aqueduct, provided that the requisites are met (proof of sufficient right over the water, demonstration that the chosen way is the most convenient and least onerous to third parties, and the obligation to indemnify the owner of the servient estate).

The Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, specifically Article 125, which supports the application of a compulsory easement subject to appropriate conditions and objections by the owner of the servient land.

Whether the two canals constructed on the land, being those installed without notations on the Torrens title, constitute voluntary easements that are susceptible to extinction by registration under Section 39 of Act No. 496.
If so, whether the erection of the first canal, constructed without compliance with the procedural requirements (e.g., under Articles 557/558 of the Civil Code) or entry in the certificate of title, has been legally extinguished.

Whether defendant Mariano B. Banzon can claim a compulsory easement (aqueduct) despite the non-registration of the canal, given that:

He has obtained a grant from the Director of Public Works authorizing the use of 50 liters of water per second from the Talisay River.
He has complied with the tripartite requisites stipulated in Article 558 of the Civil Code (right to water, least onerous route, and readiness to indemnify the servient estate).

Whether the counterclaim asserting the right to maintain and use the second canal is valid against the background of the registration effect on voluntary easements.

Whether the registration of lot No. 362, which did not record any easements, effectively extinguishes the alleged rights of the defendants on the first canal.
The distinction between the rights arising from historical use and the statutory requirements for creating an easement on registered land.