G.R. No. L-28114 - IN RE: Tuazon de Perez

Petitioner Antonio M. Perez filed an appeal from lower court orders dated April 17, 1967, and May 29, 1967, which denied his so-called second motion for partial execution.
The motion sought the issuance of an order directing Monserrat Enterprises Co., Inc. (a third party) to surrender five certificates of title over certain properties in Manila that were allegedly transferred to him pursuant to a compromise agreement.

In an earlier special proceeding instituted by Perez and his son Benigno against Angela Tuazon de Perez, the parties submitted a compromise agreement executed on May 2, 1958, designed to resolve a guardianship action against Angela for alleged prodigality.
The Manila court of first instance dismissed that case for lack of jurisdiction, a dismissal later affirmed by this Court on appeal.
Subsequent to the dismissal, the domestic (guardianship) court also dismissed the proceeding on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
A renewed submission of the compromise agreement was made in November 1966 by Angela’s new attorney-in-fact, assisted by new counsel, and subsequently approved by this Court in its November 17, 1966 resolution.

Under the compromise agreement, Angela had ceded certain real properties to Perez, which included transfer provisions affecting seven properties (with particular emphasis on the five properties now controlled by Monserrat Enterprises).
Prior to the compromise, on October 29, 1957, Angela had sold five of her properties to Monserrat Enterprises Co., Inc.
Although these properties were part of Angela’s paraphernal estate, the deeds of sale, executed by her, were not registered until after May 2, 1958—the same date as the execution of the compromise agreement.
The registration of these deeds led to the issuance of new certificates of title, where an annotation of the compromise agreement had been noted on the certificates originally in Angela’s name.

In a companion case (Armando V. Ampil vs. Hon. Judge Corazon Juliano Agrava, et al.), Perez and his son had similarly filed a motion for partial execution, prompting a domestic court order requiring the surrender of three titles.
This Court, upon review in the Ampil case, set aside the domestic court’s disregard of an asserted attorney’s retaining lien and ruled on the effectivity of the compromise agreement.
Concurrently, Monserrat Enterprises pursued litigation asserting its right of prior title and ownership, contesting the validity of the compromise agreement as applied to the properties.
Monserrat also filed a complaint for quieting title and, later, a separate complaint regarding the “intrinsic nullity” of the compromise agreement—both of which were dismissed by the courts.
During the pendency of the appeal, petitioner Perez also filed a motion seeking a writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the annotation of the compromise agreement on the titles pending disputes, though various third parties (including subsequent purchasers of the properties) opposed this motion.
Angela Perez de Staley, acting as Angela’s attorney-in-fact through a renewed submission of the compromise agreement, was allowed to intervene in the case, noting that Perez had undertaken to hold the properties in trust for the children.

The controversy involves conflicting claims: Perez’s claim based on the compromised transfer (as confirmed in November 1966) versus Monserrat’s claim arising from the earlier sale and registration of the properties.
Additional complications arise due to subsequent sales by Monserrat to other bona fide purchasers, which further cloud the issue of title and the applicability of the compromise agreement.
The domestic court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the conflicting property title issues, especially those involving a third party like Monserrat, as these controversies should be handled in a separate independent action before a regular court of proper jurisdiction.

Whether the domestic court had jurisdiction to grant petitioner's motion for partial execution by ordering a third party to surrender certificates of title.
Whether the guardianship court could adjudicate a dispute over property title where conflicting rights exist between the incompetent’s estate (and its purported transferees) and a bona fide third party.

Whether the transfer of property rights under the compromise agreement, originally executed on May 2, 1958 and later confirmed in November 1966, could retroactively affect the ownership of the properties transferred prior to its confirmation.
Whether the compromise agreement was binding on Monserrat, given that its acquisitions predate the effective transfer on November 1966 as confirmed by the Court.

Whether Perez’s retaining lien over the certificates of title, acquired during his tenure as Angela’s counsel, remains enforceable despite the later transfers and interventions.
Whether such a lien can be applied to third-party title disputes involving cleans titles held by bona fide purchasers.