A.M. No. 2410 - IN RE: Pajo

In an information dated August 10, 1976, respondents Rodolfo Pajo and Clodualdo Origenes were charged before the City Court of Davao City with falsification of public document under Article 172, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
At trial, both accused were found guilty. Clodualdo Origenes was convicted as the principal offender and sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment term ranging from four (4) months and one (1) day to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days, fined P1,000.00 (with subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency) plus costs.
Rodolfo Pajo, initially found guilty as an accomplice, received a sentence of four (4) months and one (1) day imprisonment and a fine of P500.00 (with subsidiary imprisonment if insolvent) plus costs.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment against Clodualdo Origenes was affirmed without modification.
The Court of Appeals modified Pajo’s conviction, finding him guilty as a principal offender instead of as an accomplice. His sentence was enhanced to match that of Origenes, with imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days, along with a fine of P1,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment calculated at P8.00 per day not exceeding one third of the principal penalty, but not exceeding one year, plus costs.
The appellate decision was promulgated on February 22, 1982, with records indicating that Pajo received a copy of the decision on March 10, 1982, and the denial of his motion for reconsideration on April 15, 1982.

On June 7, 1982, Atty. Rodolfo Pajo filed a petition for review on certiorari of the appellate decision, challenging the finding of guilt as co-principal through conspiracy in the falsification case.
The First Division of the Supreme Court denied the petition on June 14, 1982, on two grounds:

The petition lacked a statement of material dates necessary to determine the timeliness of its filing.
Even if material dates were provided, the petition was devoid of merit.

A motion for reconsideration was received on June 29, 1982, asserting that the docket, legal research, and allied fees in G.R. No. 60654 (the petition for review) were paid on June 7, 1982. However, the motion merely included a bare statement regarding the timely payment of fees without showing proper filing procedures before the lapse of the reglementary period.
It was noted from the Court of Appeals records that the petition was filed fifty-three (53) days after Pajo received the resolution denying his earlier motion for reconsideration.

On June 29, 1982, concurrent with the filing of the motion for reconsideration, disbarment proceedings were initiated as Administrative Case No. 2410 against Atty. Rodolfo Pajo.
The proceedings required Pajo to show cause why he should not be disbarred by reason of a final judgment.
In the meantime, Pajo was suspended from the practice of law pending the outcome of the disbarment case.
The factual record indicated that Pajo, as an attorney, prepared and notarized a falsified deed of sale involving a deceased vendor—a deed executed on February 16, 1976, despite the vendor having been dead for almost eight (8) years.
Evidence showed that Pajo was not only familiar with the vicinity and personal circumstances surrounding the purported affiant (Nestoria Origenes) but was also aware that the deed of sale was based on false representations, having attended the wake and burial of the supposed vendor.

In his Manifestation-Explanation received on September 15, 1982, Pajo presented several grounds in a bid to justify his actions and avoid disbarment:

He claimed a humble background as an orphan and a student leader who worked his way through college to become a lawyer.
He cited his twelve (12) years of active law practice and the many cases he had handled, asserting that his professional record made it improbable that he would deliberately cause his own destruction.
He reiterated the defenses he had previously advanced in the lower courts, contending his innocence regarding the charge of falsification.

Despite these arguments, the Court found that his acts—especially taking advantage of his office to notarize a falsified deed—amounted to grave misconduct.
The Court noted that the crime of falsification of a public document, being contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals, inherently involves moral turpitude.

Whether the petition for review on certiorari was timely filed given that it was submitted fifty-three (53) days after receipt of the resolution denying Pajo's motion for reconsideration.
Whether the petition correctly complied with the requirement of stating material dates to establish its timeliness.

Whether Atty. Rodolfo Pajo’s conduct in preparing and notarizing a falsified deed of sale, despite knowing the vendor had been deceased for an extended period, constituted a crime involving moral turpitude.
Whether Pajo's role in the falsification—transitioning from an accomplice to being found guilty as a principal offender—was legally supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Whether Pajo’s conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude automatically warranted his disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Supreme Court Rules on Attorney Disciplinary Matters.
Whether the defense arguments regarding Pajo's humble beginnings, professional record, and alleged innocence were sufficient to mitigate the gravity of his offense and avoid disbarment.