IN RE: Lontok

Marcelino Lontok, then a practicing lawyer in the Philippine Islands, was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales for the crime of bigamy.
His conviction, which included an eight-year imprisonment sentence along with accessory penalties and the payment of costs, was subsequently affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court.

On February 9, 1921, the Governor-General, exercising authority under the Philippine Organic Act of August 29, 1916, issued a pardon to Marcelino Lontok.
The wording of the pardon remitted the sentence and its attendant penalties on the condition that Lontok “shall not again be guilty of any misconduct.”

The Attorney-General invoked section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended “by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.”
It is uncontested that bigamy is deemed to involve moral turpitude within the context of the law.

The Government contended that while the pardon effectively removes the legal infamy and consequent penal effects of the offense, it does not eliminate the “moral stain” attached to Lontok’s character.
In contrast, Lontok argued that the pardon eradicates the offense entirely, thereby invalidating any basis for the disbarment proceedings.

Where disbarment is automatically triggered by a felony conviction, a pardon operates as a bar to further disbarment proceedings (e.g., In re Emmons; Scott vs. State).
Where disbarment is based on broader professional misconduct culminating in conviction, a pardon may remove penal consequences yet fail to obviate proof of deficiency in moral character (e.g., People vs. Burton; People vs. George; Nelson vs. Com.; In re).

The precedent set in Ex parte Garland, where a full pardon was held to release the offender “as if he had never committed the offense,” was particularly influential.

The court noted that under Article 130 of the Penal Code, one mode of extinguishing criminal liability is through a pardon.
The disbarment action in this instance was solely predicated on the judgment of conviction—now mitigated by the pardon—and not on any subsequent misconduct by Lontok.

Whether the full pardon issued by the Governor-General, which remitted the sentence for bigamy, effectively nullifies the legal basis for disbarment under the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Whether the pardon erases both the legal infamy and the moral blemish associated with a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.
The extent to which precedent (such as Ex parte Garland) applies in determining if a pardoned conviction can still serve as valid grounds for disbarment.