G.R. No. L-4164 - IN RE: Infante vs. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental

Antonio Infante was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
He began serving his sentence on June 21, 1927.
On March 6, 1939, after serving 15 years, 7 months, and 11 days, he was granted a conditional pardon.
The pardon was accompanied by the condition that “he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.”

On April 25, 1949, Infante was convicted by the Municipal Court of Bacolod City for driving a jeep without a license.

On July 13, 1950, by virtue of the authority conferred on the President through section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Executive Secretary ordered Infante’s re-arrest and recommitment to the custody of the Director of Prisons in Muntinlupa, Rizal.

The order was executed on the ground that Infante violated the condition of his pardon.

Infante filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contesting the re-arrest order.
The main contention of the petitioner was that section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, which authorized the re-arrest, had been abrogated.
A second contention raised was regarding the prescription of the remitted penalty, which corresponded to the unserved portion of his original sentence (one year and 11 days), given that more than ten years had lapsed since his pardon.

The case references the decision in Sales vs. Director of Prisons, which established that:

The Revised Penal Code contains a repealing clause that does not affect section 64(i) of the Administrative Code.
Act No. 4103 (the Indeterminate Sentence Law) preserves the President’s authority under section 64(i).

The decision underscores that the authority given to the President to authorize re-arrest does not run counter to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (article 159) regarding the violation of a conditional pardon.

Whether section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code remains in force and may be used to order the re-arrest of a pardoned convict for violating the conditions of his pardon.
Whether the petitioner's conviction for a minor offense (driving without a license) constitutes a sufficient violation of the condition imposed in his pardon.
Whether the simultaneous application of section 64(i) and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code results in double punishment for the same offense.
Whether the remitted penalty (the unserved sentence of one year and 11 days) has prescribed given the lapse of more than ten years, or if prescription is inapplicable owing to the absence of evasion of sentence.