A.M. No. 88-4-5433 - IN RE: Gonzalez

The Court received the first indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Raul M. Gonzalez, Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor, forwarding an anonymous letter-complaint dated 14 December 1987 by the "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court," addressed to Gonzalez.
The letter referred to disbarment charges filed by Miguel Cuenco against Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and requested Gonzalez to intervene.
Attached to the letter was also a telegram from Miguel Cuenco addressed to Gonzalez, which referred to pleadings Cuenco filed on 29 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. 3135. Cuenco opined that Gonzalez’s intervention was improper but encouraged him to file a responsive pleading before the Supreme Court en banc to comply with the petition of the Concerned Employees asking for Tanodbayan’s intervention.

The Court directed the Clerk of Court to provide Raul M. Gonzalez with a copy of the per curiam Resolution dated 17 February 1988 dismissing the charges for disbarment against Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit.
That same Resolution required complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Justice Fernan.
The Court granted Cuenco an extension until 30 March 1988 to file a Motion for Reconsideration, which he filed on 28 March 1988, treated by the Court as a Motion for Reconsideration in Administrative Case No. 3135.
The Court denied with finality Cuenco’s Motion for Reconsideration by a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988.

The Court underscored the constitutional rule that public officers required to be members of the Philippine Bar, such as Supreme Court Justices, who may only be removed by impeachment, cannot be subjected to disbarment proceedings during their incumbency.
It further held that such officers cannot be criminally charged in courts like the Sandiganbayan with offenses carrying penalties that would amount to removal from office during their incumbency.
The Court relied on provisions of the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII, Section 7(1) and Article XI, Sections 2 and 3) showing that removal from office for such public officers is exclusively by impeachment and conviction.

The Court referenced Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan (128 SCRA 324, 1984), which held similarly on the exclusive remedy of impeachment for constitutional officers and that criminal proceedings cannot proceed against them during their incumbency if the offense carries removal from office as penalty.
The constitutional intent was clarified that impeachment judgment extends only to removal from office and disqualification to hold office but does not preclude subsequent prosecution and trial after removal.

The Court clarified that it did not grant immunity from liability or prosecution for acts of misbehavior or violation of judicial ethics. Instead, it emphasized the constitutional procedural requirement of removal by impeachment before other liabilities can be enforced during incumbency.
The rule enshrines judicial independence and separation of powers, protecting Members of the Supreme Court from harassment through charges aimed at influencing judicial functions.
The Court instructed that prosecuting officers should dismiss forthwith any charges against sitting Members of the Court, and the proper remedy for grievances against such constitutional officers is impeachment.

Whether a sitting Member of the Supreme Court who is constitutionally qualified as a member of the Philippine Bar can be subjected to disbarment proceedings during the incumbency of such Member.
Whether criminal or administrative proceedings can be instituted against a constitutional officer like a Supreme Court Justice who may only be removed by impeachment, during his incumbency, for offenses carrying penalties that include removal from office.
The proper remedy available to persons with legitimate grievances against a sitting Member of the Supreme Court for alleged misconduct or violation of judicial ethics.