IN RE: Flordeliza

Six members of the Sorsogon Bar, representing at least 50% of the province’s legal practice, filed a verified petition for the removal of Judge Tomas Flordeliza of the First Instance, Sixteenth Judicial District.
The charges against Judge Flordeliza were threefold:

Falsely certifying the status of pending cases, thereby allegedly violating section 129 of the Administrative Code.
Exhibiting delay and lack of diligence in disposing of cases (in alleged violation of section 165 of the Administrative Code and judicial standards).
Demonstrating partiality in the performance of his judicial duties.

Alleged undue deference and manifest partiality toward certain individuals, including Father Casiano de Vera, Fermin Barranechea, justice of the peace Gillego de Vera, justice of the peace Felix Gallego, and Amado Gimenez.
Accusations of discourteous treatment toward the complainants while showing condescension toward attorneys Francisco Arellano and Federico Jimenez.

In response to being served the complaint, Judge Flordeliza filed a verified answer denying all charges and countered by suggesting that the complainants be disbarred.

Certificates attesting to the moral conduct, social standing, and integrity of Judge Flordeliza were provided by:

Discrepancies regarding the number of cases reported as disposed of by the judge versus official records.
Figures on civil, criminal, probate, land registration, and administrative cases for the year 1921 and the pending cases as of late 1921 and September 1922.

Allegation that too many cases were scheduled in one day, exceeding recommended court hours.
Complaint that court sessions were held for only three and a half hours, although section 165 mandates at least five hours each day.
Charge of delay in the disposition of criminal cases, particularly those involving the accused without bail, with a delay ranging from four to nine months.
The most serious charge involved the alleged false certification under section 129 of the Administrative Code aimed at securing salary payment:

Instances of decisions made beyond the 90-day period prescribed by law.
The judge’s attempted justifications: excluding stenographers' transcription time, vacation periods, commencing time from clerk’s report, and accepting oral decisions.

Does the false certification of pending cases, as alleged under section 129 of the Administrative Code, constitute sufficient evidence of judicial misconduct?
How should “determined and decided” be interpreted within the context of section 129?

Is the delay and alleged reduced duration of court sessions in violation of section 165 of the Administrative Code?
Should the burden of delays in criminal cases, particularly those involving defendants without bail, be attributed solely to the judge?

Are the allegations of partiality towards certain legal practitioners and local officials substantiated?
Can partiality be objectively proven to a degree that would justify proceeding with an impeachment?

To what extent may external factors (e.g., unavailability of government witnesses, transcription delays, or vacation periods) be exculpatory in the computation of the 90-day period?
Does the judge’s explanation meet the required standards for accountability and efficiency?