A.C. No. 11111 - IN RE: Eligio Mallari

In 1968, respondent Atty. Eligio P. Mallari secured two loans from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) totaling P34,000, using mortgages over two parcels of land registered in his and his wife’s names.
Due to his failure to meet his financial obligations, GSIS repeatedly reminded him to settle his account.

On March 21, 1984, GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, following respondent’s inability to pay.
Respondent managed to delay the foreclosure by requesting a final computation of his outstanding account and convincing the Sheriff to postpone the publication of the foreclosure notice.
Although GSIS provided detailed account statements on December 13, 1984 and May 30, 1985, it eventually commenced foreclosure on July 21, 1986.

On August 22, 1986, respondent filed a complaint for injunction (Civil Case No. 7802) against GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Fernando, Pampanga.
The RTC initially ruled in his favor; however, after an appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision on March 27, 1996.
The Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 124468, denied respondent’s petition for review and his motion for reconsideration, thereby rendering the CA decision final and executory.

On September 2, 1999, GSIS filed an ex parte motion for execution, leading the RTC to issue a writ of execution cum writ of possession on October 21, 1999.
The Sheriff’s attempt to serve the writ was hampered partly by respondent’s request for an extension to vacate the properties.
Instead of vacating, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration to quash the writ on March 27, 2000.

Simultaneously, respondent filed a case for consignation (Civil Case No. 12053) with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order against the GSIS and the Sheriff, which was later dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Respondent further filed motions in Civil Case No. 7802 alleging contempt of court against GSIS and its local manager for actions taken during the pendency of his motion to quash the writ.

In G.R. No. 157659, this Court observed that respondent’s actions were dilatory and intended to delay the execution of a final and executory judgment.
The Court directed the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-CBD) to investigate his conduct, specifically his disregard of the Rules of Court concerning the writ of possession and his violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The IBP-CBD found that respondent’s tactics were deliberate dilatory maneuvers designed to obstruct justice.
It recommended a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for at least one year.
The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XX-2013-513, adopted these findings and denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration.

In his answer to the disbarment complaint, respondent argued that he did not deliberately violate court rules or his professional oath.
He maintained that he was still the rightful owner of the properties because:

The action for mortgage had prescribed due to the lapse of more than 10 years.
He had a one-year right of redemption beginning February 22, 1997.
He preserved his right of redemption through a valid tender of payment and consignment on May 28, 1997.
The GSIS’ refusal to receive his payment justified his filing of a case for consignation on March 27, 2000.

Additionally, respondent argued that most pleadings were signed by his lawyer, Atty. Andres Ocampo, except for two documents.

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, holding that the writ of possession is a ministerial act and that respondent, as a non-redeeming mortgagor, had no right to challenge its issuance.
It concluded that respondent’s actions were motivated by bad faith and amounted to an abuse of legal process, thus warranting disciplinary sanctions.

Whether respondent deliberately disregarded the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence regarding the issuance and implementation of the writ of possession.

Did his actions constitute an abuse of court procedures aimed at stalling the execution of a final and executory judgment?

Whether respondent violated his Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Specifically, did his conduct breach Canons 10 and 12 and Rules 10.03, 12.02, and 12.04 of the CPR?

Whether respondent’s assertions regarding his continued right to the properties (based on prescription, right of redemption, and valid tender/consignation) held any legal merit in the context of a final and executory judgment.

Whether the writ of possession, being a purely ministerial act, precluded any substantive challenge by respondent once the decision had attained finality.

Is it procedurally impermissible for a lawyer to use dilatory tactics even if he is also a litigant in his own case?