A.C. No. 11173 - CA-G.R. CV No. 96282 vs. Santamaria

Plaintiffs, spouses Melchor and Valentina Bernardez, initiated Civil Case 657 against spouses Joaquin and Angustia Balmaceda for recovery of a parcel of land.
The plaintiffs contended that they had acquired the land from Tranquilina Vda. de Pabalan via a deed of sale dated September 18, 1969, which was duly notarized and registered on September 30, 1969, in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Abra.
At the pre-trial conference on September 13, 1972, the defendants – through their counsel, Atty. Agripino A. Brillantes – contested their status as real parties in interest by presenting a duplicate deed of sale dated April 13, 1969, allegedly executed in favor of Dr. Restituto Balmaceda, thereby introducing a conflicting version of the transaction.

They acknowledged the existence of a notarized document (Exhibit "A") from September 18, 1969.
They admitted also to a document from April 13, 1969, which was not notarized (marked Exhibit "1").

The stipulation raised a key question regarding which deed of sale should prevail – the later, notarized and registered document or the earlier, non-notarized document.
Based on this stipulation and the documentary evidence presented, the trial court, with Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella presiding, decided on February 7, 1973, in favor of the plaintiffs as the true and lawful owners.

Initiation of Administrative and Criminal Proceedings Against Atty. Brillantes

On December 15, 1972, during the pendency of Civil Case 657, Atty. Romeo R. Bringas (a nephew of the defendants) filed two sworn complaints against Atty. Brillantes.

The complaints alleged that Brillantes notarized the deed of sale on April 13, 1969, without being commissioned to perform notarial duties, in violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
It was also alleged that he knowingly introduced the deed as evidence in the civil case, contravening the last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

Judge Gironella conducted a preliminary investigation and found a prima facie case against the respondent, leading to the filing of two criminal informations for falsification on March 16, 1973.
Atty. Bringas further secured the suspension of Atty. Brillantes by filing an unverified motion, which the trial court eventually converted into a separate administrative proceeding by ordering the suspension effective September 10, 1973, with a two-year period.

Multiple sources—including testimony from the Executive Judge Juan P. Aquino and the Clerk of Court Atty. Gelacio Bolante—indicated that Atty. Brillantes was never commissioned as a notary public for Abra from 1967 onward.
Critical evidence involved a discrepancy in Exhibit "1":

One version was a carbon original copy notarized by Brillantes, complete with his notarial seal.
The other version, although identical in content, had its acknowledgment mutilated, thereby casting doubts on its notarization despite the clear presence of a notarial seal.

Review of the records, including the certified list of commissioned notaries for Abra from the relevant years, confirmed that Brillantes had not been appointed.

Following the suspension order, Atty. Brillantes filed a petition on November 6, 1973, to lift the immediate effectivity of his suspension, which was denied.
A supplemental complaint was filed on March 1, 1974, alleging additional misconduct related to actions in other judicial proceedings, including a petition for certiorari and a motion for dismissal in a separate case (C.A.-G.R. No. SP-01828).
The respondent’s defenses included multiple technical and jurisdictional arguments, claiming:

The exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for suspension or disbarment cases under Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
That administrative disciplinary proceedings should be handled by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines through an appropriate grievance committee pursuant to Rule 139-A.
That the genuineness of the document marked Exhibit "1" as accepted by the parties in the civil case rendered the notarial commission irrelevant.
That the final resolution of related criminal cases should be awaited and that his right to an impartial trial had been compromised.

Whether Atty. Brillantes notarized a deed of sale without being properly commissioned as a notary public.

Did his act of notarizing the deed in Civil Case 657, despite lacking the requisite commission, constitute a violation of his duty as an officer of the court?
Was the introduction of the spurious and falsified document, with its discrepant versions, a deliberate act meant to mislead the court and the parties involved?

Whether the suspension proceedings against Atty. Brillantes were properly initiated and whether the procedural defenses raised (such as the procedural requirement for an oath in filing complaints and the applicable Rules of Court) were tenable.

Is the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance under Rule 138 adequate to investigate and order the suspension of an attorney, notwithstanding arguments favoring Rule 139?
Is the court justified in dismissing the technical defenses, including the contention that the complaint was not under oath?

Whether the pending criminal cases interrelated to the falsification charges should preclude or delay the imposition of administrative sanctions.

Should administrative and disciplinary proceedings await the final resolution of the criminal case, or may they proceed concurrently given the differing standards of proof?

Whether the integrity and proper administration of justice were compromised by Atty. Brillantes’ conduct, thereby justifying severe sanctions such as suspension and disbarment.