G.R. No. 47442 - Icard vs. Masigan

Joseph K. Icard, having rendered services in connection with the development and location of certain mining claims, filed a claim of P2,000 against the estate of his deceased father, George M. Icard.
The claim was approved by the commissioners on claims and subsequently affirmed by the Court of First Instance, despite the administrator’s contention.

Plaintiff-Appellee: Joseph K. Icard, who not only filed the service claim but also had a vested interest in certain mining claims formerly owned by his father and a third party.
Defendants/Appellants:

Claro Masigan, serving as the special administrator of the estate of George M. Icard.
Effie Garland Icard, whose interests in the estate came under judicial scrutiny.

The Antamok Central Group of mining claims in Benguet were originally owned in common by Fred M. Harden, the deceased George M. Icard, and Joseph K. Icard.
The mining claims were later sold to the Big Wedge Mining Company.

The deed of sale was executed jointly by the common owners.
In the execution, Joseph K. Icard was represented by his attorney-in-fact, the deceased George M. Icard, signifying the intertwined nature of their interests.

A dispute arose regarding the price payable under the contract of sale, prompting the Big Wedge Mining Company to initiate an action for rescission (Civil Case No. 48186) against the vendors, including Joseph K. Icard in his personal capacity and in his role as executor of the deceased’s estate.
The parties eventually settled, and the court approved a compromise agreement.

The compromise resulted in an order for the Big Wedge Mining Company to pay P39,478.16 to Joseph K. Icard.
The order stipulated that this amount be divided between Joseph K. Icard and the estate of George M. Icard in proportions to be determined by the probate court.

The administrator’s appeal rested significantly on the contention that the probate court erred in permitting Joseph K. Icard to testify about services rendered before his father’s death.
The contention was based on Section 383, paragraph 7 of Act No. 190 (now Rule 123, section 26, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court), which ordinarily restricts a plaintiff’s oral testimony regarding matters that occurred before the death of a party defendant.

It was asserted that Joseph K. Icard had a legitimate interest in the mining claims, as evidenced by both the deed of sale and the compromise agreement.
The oral testimony was intended to prove a smaller claim than what might be derived solely from written evidence, thereby minimizing any potential prejudice to the estate of the deceased.

Whether the probate court erred in allowing Joseph K. Icard to testify about services rendered before the death of George M. Icard, notwithstanding the proviso contained in Section 383, paragraph 7 (now Rule 123, section 26, paragraph (c)) of the Rules of Court.
Whether the rule, designed to prevent the introduction of oral evidence that might lead to fictitious or inflated claims against a deceased party, should in this instance bar testimony aiming to prove a claim smaller than what is evidenced in writing.

Whether Joseph K. Icard’s participation in the mining claims—evidenced by the deed of sale and the court-approved compromise—is sufficient to entitle him to a share of the P39,478.16, even though the precise amount of his interest was not determined initially.
Whether the division of the settlement amount as directed by the compromise is consistent with the statutory and equitable principles governing estate administration.

Whether the underlying rationale of the rule—to prevent false claims and maintain the integrity of the deceased’s record—applies in this scenario where the oral testimony was offered not to exaggerate but to clarify a diminished claim.