G.R. No. L-39125 - Ibatan vs. Melicor

Private respondent initiated a partition action in Civil Case No. C-839 before the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
The trial court rendered a decision on July 21, 1966, which:

Determined that certain parcels (sub-paragraphs 3, 4, and 6) were not part of the estate of the deceased spouses, Alejandro Ibatan and Juana Dagalea.
Declared that other parcels (sub-paragraphs 1, 2, 5, and 7) belonged to the deceased Alejandra Ibatan and were subject to co-ownership and partition among her children and Quiterio Ibatan.
Provided specific instructions on the division of parcels and the distribution of products and rentals from these properties.
Ordered the payment of attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and costs of the suit.

The trial court issued a writ of execution on January 20, 1970, to enforce the final and executory judgment.
On March 13, 1970, the deputy sheriff levied the real properties of the judgment debtor, Quiterio Ibatan, for the satisfaction of the money judgment.

Quiterio Ibatan refused to sign for acknowledgment of the writ, citing his intention to consult his lawyer.
The return of the writ mentioned that the properties were divided, with parts delivered to the children of Alejandra Ibatan and Quiterio Ibatan, despite the debtor’s nonappearance.

A notice of levy was registered on March 17, 1970, with the Register of Deeds in Leyte.
Petition for Contempt and Motions

On June 29, 1970, private respondents filed a petition for contempt against Quiterio Ibatan, who failed to respond to notices for partition.
On July 25, 1970, the respondent judge denied the petition for contempt on the grounds that the executed delivery was invalid due to lack of specific details regarding the portions of land to be delivered.
The court ordered the parties to agree on a partition project; in case of disagreement, a deputy sheriff was commissioned to inspect and propose a partition project.

Quiterio Ibatan died on June 6, 1971, and petitioners subsequently substituted as his legal heirs.
Respondents then filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on September 14, 1971, which was granted on September 18, 1971, leading to the issuance of the alias writ on October 5, 1971.
A subsequent notice of levy on execution was filed on November 15, 1971, covering the money judgment plus additional fees and expenses.

On April 3, 1972, petitioners moved to set aside the alias writ of execution and the levy on execution, arguing that since the judgment debtor had died, the execution of the money judgment was no longer valid.
The motion was denied on the ground that it failed to disclose the identities of the movants.

Petitioners also filed a petition for repartition, asserting that only three parcels needed partitioning rather than four, proposing a more equitable division.
On October 21, 1972, the trial court granted this petition, directed an ocular inspection, and approved the resultant partition project.
On April 18, 1973, the court denied petitioners’ motion to set aside the alias writ of execution.
Consequently, on June 28, 1973, the deputy sheriff sold the levied properties at a public auction to private respondent Gertrudes Ibatan, the sole bidder.

The levy based on the sheriff’s execution on March 13, 1970 was invalid because it was executed pursuant to a void writ of execution.
The court’s earlier order on July 25, 1970, which dismissed the petition for contempt due to improper specifications in the delivery of portions of the property, rendered the execution flawed.

They further argued that the issuance of the alias writ of execution after Quiterio Ibatan’s death (June 6, 1971) should be nullified under Section 7, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as execution should not proceed against the deceased judgment debtor’s properties.

Whether the original writ of execution issued on January 20, 1970, and the corresponding levy on execution on March 13, 1970, are valid and enforceable despite the subsequent death of the judgment debtor.
Whether petitioners, by failing to contest the validity of the original writ of execution before the trial court, are estopped from now challenging the levy and execution sale.
Whether the subsequent issuance of an alias writ of execution and corresponding levy post the judgment debtor’s death invalidates or affects the validity of the original execution process.
Whether the irregularities cited by petitioners regarding the improper specifications in the delivery by the sheriff and the partition process are sufficient to annul or set aside the executed proceedings.