G.R. No. L-313 - Ibanez vs. Herdez

The petitioner, Ciriaco Ibanez, was prosecuted in seventeen (17) separate cases for violating Article 213 of the Revised Penal Code, and in four (4) cases for misappropriation of public funds under Article 217 of the same Code.
The cases concerning misappropriation were tried jointly by agreement of the parties.

The Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered a decision on May 22, 1941, finding the petitioner guilty in all seventeen cases for violation of Article 213 and in all four cases for misappropriation.
However, in execution, the court convicted the petitioner only in three of the seventeen cases for violation of Article 213 and in three of the four cases of misappropriation, in accordance with Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was partially successful, with the appellate court affirming the lower court’s decision but with modifications.
No certiorari appeal to the Supreme Court was filed within the prescribed period; as a result, the appellate decision became final fifteen (15) days after its promulgation.
Following the entry of the judgment, the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance for the execution of the judgment pursuant to the applicable Rules of Court.

Petitioner contended that the judgment could not be executed because he was hiding in the mountains of Leyte, claiming his absence was necessary to preserve loyalty to the Commonwealth and to avoid serving a sentence imposed by the Japanese-sponsored government.
On June 8, the petitioner filed a motion before the Court of First Instance of Leyte requesting a suspension of the reading of the appellate decision. He argued that the decision was invalid because it was rendered by a court created by the Japanese-sponsored government, a body he claimed was null and void.
The petitioner further argued that a properly constituted Court of Appeals had yet to decide on the merits of his appeal.

The provincial fiscal of Leyte filed a well-prepared opposition to the petitioner’s motion.
Relying on the doctrine laid down in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, the Court of First Instance of Leyte denied the motion, upholding the legitimacy of the appellate decision.

The petitioner asserted that his physical absence (hiding in the mountains) prevented him from filing a timely motion for a new trial and from appealing by certiorari from the Court of Appeals’ decision.
He alleged that the Japanese government had attempted to arrest him and had compelled him to serve the sentence.
It was argued that judicial authorities in Leyte had set aside the sentence following an amnesty granted by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines.
The petitioner contended that the cases, having been decided by the Court of Appeals under a Japanese-sponsored government, had acquired an international character requiring the application of International Law.
He maintained that three of the seventeen cases and three of the misappropriation cases concerned the same facts, thereby constituting multiple prosecutions for a single act, in violation of an Attorney General circular.
Finally, the petitioner claimed that the respondents had acted beyond their jurisdiction when they issued orders to enforce the decision.

The petitioner’s motion and subsequent petition made explicit reference to the doctrine established in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, as well as other pertinent cases such as Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons.
The decision also discusses various U.S. Supreme Court cases (e.g., Jones vs. United States, United States vs. Rice, Fleming vs. Page) to address the implications of de facto government and the political nature of determining sovereignty.

Justices Hilado, Perfecto, and Briones dissented from the majority opinion, challenging the rationale regarding the non-political nature of the case and the validity of the judicial acts of the Japanese-sponsored government.
The dissenting opinions emphasized that the issue of sovereignty is fundamentally a political question to be resolved by the legislative and executive branches, and they expressed that the petitioner’s circumstances should have warranted an opportunity to exhaust available judicial remedies.

Whether the judgments and sentences rendered by the Court of First Instance and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, despite being issued under a Japanese-sponsored government, remain valid and executable.
Whether the execution of the decision is proper under the existing Rules of Court given that the petitioner was hiding in the mountains.

Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to execute the Court of Appeals’ decision, considering the petitioner’s contention that a duly constituted appellate court had not yet passed on the merits of his appeal.
Whether a court acting under the Japanese-sponsored government’s aegis may render valid judicial decisions.

Whether the petitioner's argument that his conviction was a political act due to the circumstances of the Japanese occupation has merit.
Whether the doctrine that segregates political questions from judicial decisions properly applies to his case.

Whether the doctrine of de facto governments, as applied in preceding cases (including Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon), supports the validity of the decisions made by courts under an occupying regime.
Whether the petitioner’s allegations regarding the political legitimacy of the government and judicial proceedings justify a suspension or nullification of the decision.

Whether charging the petitioner multiple times for essentially the same act violates legal principles such as double jeopardy.
Whether the respondents exceeded their jurisdiction by taking steps to execute the judgment upon the contested grounds.