G.R. No. 181268 - Herdez vs. Ocampo

Petitioner Milagros Hernandez claimed that in 1985 she purchased two parcels of land—Lot 8 Block 3 and Lot 6 Block 3—in Binan, Laguna from Romeo Uy An as evidenced by a deed of sale.
The deed of sale established her continuous, open, and adverse possession of the lots from 1985 onward, with her daughter, Fe Hernandez-Arceo, and her family actually occupying the properties.
Hernandez entrusted her son-in-law, Ricardo San Andres, with the task of registering the lots in her name. However, after his death in 1991, the titles were never transferred, and Hernandez, residing in the United States due to old age, remained unaware of the non-registration.

In 2002, Hernandez and her family received a demand letter from Attorney Agapito Carait on behalf of respondent Felicitas R. Mendoza, instructing them to vacate Lot 8.
Investigation revealed that:

The titles to the lots were transferred – Lot 8 was registered in Mendoza’s name (TCT No. T-193772) and Lot 6 in the name of Edwina Ocampo (TCT No. T-193773) via a deed of sale dated April 13, 1989 executed by Romeo Uy An.
Both lots had been mortgaged: Lot 8 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) and Lot 6 with Philippine Savings Bank (PSB).

Lot 6 and Lot 8 were sold at public auctions; PSB and Metrobank emerged as the highest bidders.
The banks obtained Certificates of Sale leading to registration of Lot 6 under PSB on November 9, 2001 (TCT No. T-518364) and Lot 8 under Metrobank on May 6, 2003 (TCT No. T-550116).

On January 18, 2002, PSB filed a petition for issuance of a writ of possession (LRC Case No. B-3071) before the RTC in Hainan, Laguna, with the writ granted on December 22, 2002.
On May 20, 2004, Metrobank filed a similar petition (LRC Case No. B-3389) with the writ issued on July 20, 2005.

Hernandez once filed an Urgent Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint with a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction in her separate action (Civil Case No. B-6191) for cancellation of the transfer certificates of title.
The RTC denied her motion for temporary injunction in its Order dated November 30, 2004, stating the allegations against the titles were evidentiary and subject to proof at trial.
Subsequent motions, including a Motion for Reconsideration by Hernandez and petitions for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction, were filed at the Court of Appeals and later brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Whether Hernandez is entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement of the writs of possession issued by the RTC.
Whether her private claim—and alleged lack of direct involvement in the foreclosure proceedings—provides a clear and unmistakable right warranting judicial restraint against executing the writs despite her filing for annulment of the title.

Whether the enforcement of the writs of possession against Hernandez, who was not a party to the foreclosure proceedings, violates her right to due process.
Whether the alleged existence of a third party in possession with an adverse claim can justify the non-issuance (or suspension) of the possessory writs.

Whether the issuance of writs of possession under extrajudicial foreclosure is a ministerial act, which would preclude or limit the discretion of the courts in granting injunctions in related annulment actions.
Whether the proper remedy for challenging the writs is by filing a separate action rather than invoking preliminary injunctive relief in the annulment suit.