G.R. No. 6791 - HermaNo.vs. Yap Tico

The plaintiffs, Lizarraga Hermanos, initiated an action to determine ownership and secure a permanent injunction.
The injunction sought to restrain the defendants—including F.M. Yap Tico, the sole appellant—from levying upon, selling, or otherwise invading the subject real property.

The plaintiffs’ ownership and right to possession of the property were conceded.
The property was described in detail in the complaint, including its physical attributes and various fixtures, clarifying that it was the entire corpus of property and not merely an interest.

The entire property (corpus) subject to the execution, or
Merely the defendant’s (Secundino Mendezona’s) right to repurchase, leaving the plaintiffs’ possession undisturbed.

The plaintiffs alleged that the sheriff had seized the property and was advertising its sale.
The defendants contended that the sheriff merely targeted the repurchase interest, an action for which no cause of action would lie.

On the sufficiency of the statement of the cause of action under a general demurrer, and
On the adequacy of the complaint in sustaining an injunction.

The demurrer raised objections that the facts set forth did not constitute a valid cause of action and that the complaint was ambiguous and vague.
Criticism was leveled at the demurrer itself for failing to distinctly specify the precise grounds for its objection, as required by the applicable procedural statute.

The record lacked the primary evidence of the levy (i.e., the sheriff’s levy return and published notice of sale).
In lieu of such evidence, the sheriff’s answer was introduced, in which he stated his act of selling the property pursuant to the execution.
The answer confirmed that the property described in the complaint—the entire warehouse, its machinery, and accessories—was the object of the sheriff’s actions.

The prayer for relief sought a preliminary injunction enjoining all defendants and associated persons from acting to sell or seize any part of the property until after a final judgment.
The trial court’s findings included the conclusion that the sheriff had levied upon the corpus of the property, thereby invading the plaintiffs’ rights.
The sufficiency of the complaint was indirectly supported by the fact that the plaintiffs’ evidence at trial cured the ambiguity alleged in the pleadings.

On appeal, the questions focused on both the proper nature of the sheriff’s levy and the adequacy of the complaint, especially in light of the defective demurrer.
The case raised a broader doctrinal issue concerning whether defects in pleadings (specifically, the form of the demurrer) might be cured by the unobjected trial evidence establishing the cause of action.

Does the complaint state a cause of action by clearly alleging that the entire corpus of the property was seized?
Does the language of the complaint, though somewhat ambiguous in places, fairly apprise the defendants of the plaintiff’s claims?

Was the sheriff’s action directed at levying the entire property (the corpus) or merely the right to repurchase?
Can the sheriff’s answer be taken as conclusive evidence regarding the true nature of the levy in the absence of the original levy return and published notice of sale?

Was the demurrer, which objected to the sufficiency of the complaint, properly formulated according to the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., distinctly specifying the grounds of objection)?
Does a defect in the demurrer negatively affect the opportunity for a valid determination of the cause of action?

Can the admission of unobjected trial evidence cure the alleged defects in the complaint’s pleading?
Does the defendant’s failure to timely object or demur waive their right to later contest the sufficiency of the complaint?

Is the broad scope of the injunction—extending to any interference with the property—consistent with the relief specifically prayed for in the complaint?
Does the injunction improperly restrict the defendant’s right to levy upon the right to repurchase?