G.R. No. L-19827 - HermaNo.vs. De La Riva

In an earlier suit, the Supreme Court rendered a decision on January 12, 1909, in the cases recorded as R.G. No. 4604 and No. 4244 from the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila.
The parties were notified of the decision on February 13, 1909; the case record was subsequently returned to the originating CFI, duly filed and recorded.
On February 25, 1909, the plaintiff presented his bill of costs before the CFI after the record’s return.

On February 24, 1914, the plaintiff moved the CFI to enter judgment in compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision, which provided for a modification of the lower court’s judgment—changing the amount from P94,222.50 to P93,963.30, together with 8 percent per annum interest from January 1, 1906, plus court costs.
The CFI complied by entering a judgment on February 26, 1914, purportedly in conformity with the Supreme Court’s directive.
However, it was found that the Supreme Court’s clerk had already entered the prescribed judgment on February 3, 1909, as required by the opinion and the accompanying orders, thereby rendering the later CFI entry redundant and legally ineffective.

A writ of execution was issued on March 19, 1918, based on the judgment, but it was returned unsatisfied due to the absence of any property belonging to the defendant.
A subsequent execution order was issued on November 5, 1918, which similarly did not result in any recovery.
On February 15, 1922, the plaintiff filed a new action seeking to revive and enforce the judgment, contending that the revival remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure was available.

Section 443 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes a five-year period within which a writ of execution may be issued following the entry of judgment.
Section 447 of the Code provides for the revival of a judgment by a separate action before the judgment prescribes (i.e., within the ten-year limitation period as per Section 43, No. 1).
Supreme Court rules (Sections 506, and Rules 33 and 34) mandate that the judgment, upon publication and notice, must be executed by the CFI after remittance, ensuring that the entry becomes final and effective.

Whether the five-year period for issuing a writ of execution starts from the Supreme Court’s judgment entry date (January 12, 1909, or more precisely, February 3, 1909, when the clerk entered the judgment) or from the CFI’s later entry on February 26, 1914.

Whether the execution orders issued in 1918 are legally valid considering the timing of the judgment’s effective entry date and the statutory period provided under Section 443.

Whether the plaintiff’s February 15, 1922, complaint to revive and enforce the judgment falls within the legal period (the ten-year limitation period) provided for revival under Section 447, given the debate on the effective date of the judgment.

Whether, under Section 447, the cause of action to revive a judgment accrues only after the expiration of the five-year execution period or from the effective finality of the judgment as entered by the clerical order.