G.R. No. 11045 - Tolentino vs. Paraiso

The late Francisco Guballa, Sr. was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at 1002–1004 R. Hidalgo St., Quiapo, Manila, covered by TCT No. 15638, with improvements including the Bulaklak Building.
Guballa Sr. operated Bulaklak Publications from part of the building.

BUSCOPE Labor Union, representing the complainants, instituted a complaint for non‑payment of separation pay against Bulaklak Publications and/or Francisco Guballa, Sr. (NLRC Case No. 014).
A judgment rendered in favor of BUSCOPE ordered the payment of P139,123.75 as collective separation pay.

A writ of execution was issued by the NLRC, and Guballa’s property was levied upon and sold at public auction on July 8, 1975, in favor of BUSCOPE.
Despite the pendency of a motion for annulment of the certificate of sale (and the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on the title), a Final Deed of Sale was issued on November 4, 1976.
On March 10, 1978, BUSCOPE’s president sold the property to Atty. Rufino Risma, though the acquisition was not annotated in the title.
A lease agreement was later entered into on March 31, 1978 by Mozar and Risma, creating further complications.

On June 26, 1979, the Risma spouses filed an action for the issuance of a writ of possession against Guballa Sr. at the City Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 12427).
Guballa Sr. argued for dismissal on grounds of satisfaction of the NLRC judgment and lack of jurisdiction, but his prayer was denied by the lower court and later reaffirmed by motions for reconsideration.
On June 19, 1982, Guballa Sr. sold the property to Guballa Marketing Corporation, and a new TCT was issued.
On July 26, 1982, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Risma spouses was rendered by the court, but subsequent motions regarding the substitution of party-appellant were mired in non‑compliance with the Court of Appeals’ resolutions, eventually leading to the dismissal of the appeal on technical grounds.

There existed a five‑year lease between Guballa Sr. (lessor) and Emeterio M. Mozar (lessee) effective from January 1, 1973, expiring January 1, 1978.
Following the expiry, on March 16, 1979, Guballa Sr. instituted an ejectment suit against Mozar for unlawful detention and non‑payment of rentals.

The City Court of Manila (now MTC, Branch XVII) issued a decision on January 22, 1980, ordering Mozar to vacate the premises and pay the due rentals.
The decision was affirmed on appeal by the Court of First Instance on July 3, 1980, and subsequently modified by the Court of Appeals to relieve Mozar of rental liability for a specific period.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition was later filed by Mozar against Judge Madamba and others, challenging both the execution of the ejectment judgment and the granting of the writ of possession in a separate case.

Mozar acquired an interest in the property from Atty. Risma on November 25, 1982, through a Deed of Absolute Sale that was not annotated in the title.
A series of motions and orders followed concerning the issuance of alias writs of execution, status quo orders, and attempts by Mozar to delay or stay the execution.
The controversy intensified with multiple petitions, urgent motions for temporary restraining orders, and issues regarding the validity and enforcement of the writs of execution, which later became central to the appeal.
The case eventually consolidated with G.R. No. 78223 due to overlapping facts and issues.

Whether the outright substitution of the original appellant (Guballa Sr. and his heirs) by Guballa Marketing Corporation, a transferee pendente lite, was mandatory or whether failure to substitute amounted merely to a technical defect that should not warrant dismissal of the appeal.
Whether the non‑compliance with the Court of Appeals’ resolution—ordering substitution within a specified period—amounted to a deliberate default justifying dismissal.

Whether the execution of a final judgment in an ejectment case, despite having reached the Supreme Court and becoming final and executory, may be stayed on the ground that there is a supervening event (the issuance of a writ of possession in a separate possession case).
Whether the issuance and re‑issuance (alias) of writs of execution, which have already been partly executed, can be judicially restrained in light of changed circumstances without jeopardizing substantial justice.