G.R. No. 8692 - Godofredo B. Herrera, as Municipal President of Caloocan, vs. Alberto Barretto, Judge of 1st Instance of Rizal, and Constancio Joaquin

Godofredo B. Herrera, acting as Municipal President of Caloocan, filed a petition that ultimately involved a writ of certiorari.
The respondents in the case were Alberto Barretto, Judge of First Instance of Rizal, and Constancio Joaquin.

An application for a writ of certiorari was initially filed and subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court.
In connection with that application, one of the members of the Supreme Court had issued a preliminary injunction restraining the defendant from operating his cockpit.
This injunction was imposed pending the final disposition of the certiorari proceeding, thereby directly affecting the defendant’s ability to conduct his business.
The issuance of the injunction was executed upon a bond and with an undertaking under the Code of Civil Procedure, which provided for damage payments if the injunction was later found wrongful.

In a separate action in the lower court, the plaintiff had also sought a mandamus compelling the issuance of a cockpit license, which led to the temporary granting of a mandatory injunction.
The Supreme Court, while dismissing the certiorari petition, dissolved the earlier preliminary injunction.
Unsatisfied with the outcome, the respondents (or defendants in the original certiorari proceeding) moved for an assessment of damages for the period during which the injunction prevented them from operating their business.
The central controversy revolves around whether the wrongfully issued injunction—imposed without adjudicating the merits of the underlying controversy—entitles the defendant to recovery for the damages it allegedly caused.

The case raises questions regarding the appropriate application of Section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which mandates that damages should be ascertained in what is considered an “ordinary action” upon final trial.
It also involves the procedural distinction between special remedies (such as certiorari, mandate, and prohibition) and ordinary civil actions, particularly in relation to the assessment of damages arising from injunctive measures.

Is an application for a writ of certiorari to be considered an “action” in the full sense as that term is used in the Code of Civil Procedure?
Does it reach the stage at which the merits of the controversy are litigated and thereby allow for the assessment of damages?

Can a defendant claim damages for a preliminary injunction that was later dissolved, especially when such injunction prevented him from operating his business?
Should the damages be incorporated as part of the final judgment in the certiorari proceedings?

If the Supreme Court should not determine damages in certiorari proceedings, where is the proper forum for such a determination?
What impact does remanding the parties to the Court of First Instance have on preserving the rights of the certiorari defendant in assessing damages?