Title
Gallardo vs. Rimando
Case
G.R. No. 91718
Decision Date
Jul 13, 1990
A mayoral candidate's timely election protest was upheld by the Supreme Court, ruling that pre-proclamation petitions suspend the filing period, allowing the case to proceed despite initial dismissal.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 91718)
Expanded Legal Reasoning Model

Facts:

  • Background and Context
    • Gil C. Gallardo (petitioner) and Franco F. Rimando (respondent) were rival candidates for the office of Municipal Mayor of Naguilian, La Union, in the elections held on January 18, 1988.
    • Rimando was proclaimed the winner by a narrow margin of 12 votes on January 19, 1988.
  • Pre-Proclamation and Subsequent Proceedings
    • On January 22, 1988, Gallardo filed a pre-proclamation petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking annulment of Rimando’s proclamation.
    • COMELEC dismissed Gallardo’s petition on December 8, 1988.
    • Gallardo then appealed this decision on December 12, 1988 (Gallardo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 85974) and received the Supreme Court’s final dismissal of the petition on June 23, 1989.
  • Filing of the Election Protest
    • On June 30, 1989, Gallardo filed an election protest, designated as “Gil C. Gallardo vs. Franco F. Rimando,” in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 in Bauang, La Union.
    • Rimando filed a motion to dismiss the protest on the ground that it was not filed within the ten-day period after the proclamation, as required by Section 51 of the Omnibus Election Code.
    • Initially, Judge Avelino Quintos denied Rimando’s motion; however, upon a motion for reconsideration by Rimando, Judge Quintos reversed his prior decision on September 19, 1989, dismissing the protest.
    • Gallardo’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on November 24, 1989.
    • Gallardo then filed a notice of appeal on December 7, 1989, and a petition for review on December 18, 1989.
  • Core Legal Question
    • The central issue concerned whether Gallardo’s election protest was filed on time.
    • Critical provisions involved included Section 251 of the Omnibus Election Code, which mandates the filing of a protest within ten days after the proclamation of the election results, and Section 248, which suspends the running of this period upon filing a pre-proclamation petition.

Issues:

  • Timeliness of the Election Protest
    • Whether the election protest was filed within the reglementary period stipulated by Section 251 of the Omnibus Election Code after considering the suspension effect of the pre-proclamation petition.
    • Whether the computation of the ten-day period resumed only after the final resolution of the pre-proclamation case.
  • Interpretation of Statutory Provisions
    • Whether Judge Quintos’ interpretation of Section 246—regarding the finality and executory nature of the COMELEC’s decision—was correct and applicable in barring the filing of an election protest.
    • Whether the absence of a restraining order from the Supreme Court on the COMELEC decision should affect the candidate’s right to file an election contest under Section 251.
  • Impact of Pre-Proclamation Proceedings
    • Whether the suspension provided under Section 248 effectively paused the reglementary period for filing the election protest until the Commissioner’s decision became final and executory.
    • How the timeline of proceedings (including the final Supreme Court resolution of the pre-proclamation petition on June 23, 1989) influenced the computation of the filing deadline.

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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