G.R. No. 196036 - Gagui vs. Dejero

Elizabeth M. Gagui, the petitioner, initially became involved in a labor dispute following complaints filed by respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro R. Permejo for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and overtime pay, refund of transportation expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees against PRO Agency Manila, Inc. and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes.
The case originated with the filing of the complaints on 14 December 1993 and was subsequently resolved by Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos on 7 May 1997, who rendered a Decision that ordered joint and several payment by the respondents for various claims ranging from unpaid salaries to moral and exemplary damages.
Following the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, multiple writs of execution were issued: the original writ on 10 October 1997, followed by successive Alias Writs when earlier attempts remained unsatisfied.

On 30 October 2002, respondents moved to implead PRO Agency Manila, Inc.’s corporate officers and directors, including petitioner Gagui, alleging that under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 the corporate officers were jointly and severally liable for the money claim.
After a hearing, Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan issued an Order on 25 April 2003 that held petitioner jointly and solidarily liable with the original respondent, PRO Agency Manila, Inc., thereby expanding the scope of liability beyond that originally decreed in the 1997 Decision.
Subsequent alias writs of execution further pursued the enforcement of the judgment: a second alias writ on 10 June 2003 resulted in garnishment of petitioner's bank deposit; a third alias writ on 6 June 2005 levied two parcels of land owned by the petitioner in San Fernando, Pampanga.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the third alias writ of execution on 14 September 2005, followed by a Supplemental Motion on 29 June 2006. In these motions, she argued that:

She was not properly notified of her impleading as a party, thereby depriving her of the opportunity to be heard;
The dispositive portion of the 7 May 1997 Decision did not expressly hold her liable; and
Impleading her for execution purposes effectively amounted to modifying a final, executory judgment.

The Executive Labor Arbiter, Lita V. Aglibut, issued an Order on 26 June 2006 denying the petitioner’s motions on the grounds that:

The petitioner had sufficient notice but chose not to register opposition, thus implicitly waiving her right to be heard;
Under RA 8042, corporate officers may be held jointly and severally liable with the placement agency.

The petitioner’s appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was denied, affirming that for OFWs the liability of corporate officers is inherent in RA 8042.
The Court of Appeals (CA) later affirmed the NLRC decision in its 15 November 2010 Decision, reiterating that by express statutory provision the petitioner was held solidarily liable despite her non-impleaded status in the original complaint or decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed two Motions for Reconsideration in December 2010, which were both denied by the CA in a Resolution on 25 February 2011, prompting the filing of a Petition for Review on 30 March 2011.
A controversy also arose as respondents argued that the Petition for Review was filed 15 days after the expiration of the appeal period, while petitioner contended that a fresh 15‑day period began upon receipt of the Resolution denying her motions (on 16 March 2011), making the filing on 30 March 2011 timely.

Whether the filing of the Petition for Review by petitioner on 30 March 2011 fell within the afresh 15‑day period counted from the receipt of the Resolution denying her Motions for Reconsideration.
Whether the procedural approach of filing a Motion for Reconsideration, rather than a direct appeal, resulted in a loss of her right to appeal.

Whether petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc. under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, despite not being originally impleaded in the Complaint or explicitly stated as liable in the 1997 Decision.
Whether the subsequent impleading of petitioner for execution purposes amounted to an impermissible modification of a final and executory judgment, thereby violating the doctrine of the immutability of judgments.