A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845 - Gacal vs. Infante

The case involves Criminal Case No. 1136-03, wherein Faustino Ancheta was charged with murder, an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua (and, in its highest degree, considered a capital offense).
Atty. Franklin G. Gacal, acting as a private prosecutor, initiated proceedings against Judge Jaime I. Infante of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 38, Alabel, Sarangani) for his failure to hold the mandatory bail hearing before granting bail to Ancheta.
The underlying factual matrix is set against the backdrop of the constitutional and statutory requirement that any accused charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, must be afforded a bail hearing before bail may be granted.

On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. issued a warrant for the arrest of Ancheta in connection with murder; however, no bail was recommended at that stage.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., later filed the information for murder on April 21, 2003, and recommended bail in the amount of P400,000.00 despite the earlier “no bail” recommendation.
Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge Infante’s branch, and on April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders: one granting bail to Ancheta and another ordering his release on bail.

Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the twin orders, filed a “Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel Bailbond With Prayer To Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant Of Arrest Anew Or In The Alternative Very Urgent Motion for This Court to Moto Prop[r]io Correct An Apparent And Patent Error” on April 25, 2003.
During the hearing held on April 29, 2003, only Atty. Gacal and his collaborating counsel appeared, while the public prosecutor was instructed to file his comment within five days.
Despite the absence of adequate support from the public prosecutor and arguments from the defense, Judge Infante denied the very urgent motion on May 21, 2003, relying on the absence of the required written conformity from the fiscal, and on the contention that the accused had not filed a petition for bail per se.

After the denial of the motion, Atty. Gacal sought authority to act as a private prosecutor and moved for the reconsideration of granting bail, prompting further orders by Judge Infante to secure the fiscal’s comments by resetting the arraignment date repeatedly (May 29, then June 20, 2003).
The fiscal eventually filed his comment on June 4, 2003, maintaining that his recommendation for bail effectively waived the need for a bail hearing, as he considered the prosecution evidence to be merely circumstantial and not robust enough to bar bail.
On August 5, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator received an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Gacal against Judge Infante, which was later processed by the Supreme Court as the exclusive administrative authority over judicial personnel.
The administrative investigation led to a recommendation on February 16, 2004, to re-docket the case as a regular administrative matter and to impose a fine of P20,000.00 on Judge Infante.

The core allegation against Judge Infante was his granting of bail without holding the mandated bail hearing—a concession that was argued to show gross ignorance of the law and the applicable rules governing bail in capital cases.
Judge Infante’s reliance on the public prosecutor’s recommendation, his failure to inquire further into the strengths or weaknesses of the prosecution’s evidence, and his subsequent justification that no formal bail petition had been filed by the accused form the crux of the allegation.

Whether the trial judge can dispense with the mandatory bail hearing when the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, regardless of the accused not filing a petition for bail.
Whether Judge Infante’s reliance on the fiscal’s recommendation, without conducting an independent hearing to assess the strength of the prosecution’s “circumstantial” evidence, constitutes a violation of due process and judicial discretion.
Whether the failure to hold a bail hearing—essential for ascertaining whether the evidence of guilt is strong or weak—amounts to gross ignorance of law and the rules, thereby justifying administrative sanctions against the judge.
The extent to which the procedural requirements and the jurisprudential mandates bind the trial judge’s role in independently determining if the prosecution’s evidence is sufficient to bar bail.