G.R. No. 124295 - Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao

The government, through the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), initiated a fly-over construction project in Davao City.
To facilitate the project, the government filed an expropriation case (Special Civil Case No. 22,052-93) against the affected property owners: Tessie Amadeo, Reynaldo Lao, and Rev. Alfonso Galo.
The case was presided over by Judge Renato A. Fuentes, and the government eventually prevailed, though DPWH still owed a total of ₱15,510,415.00 to the owners.

On April 5, 1994, the lower court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution at the request of Tessie Amadeo, to satisfy her unpaid claim against the DPWH.
The order was transmitted to the DPWH through its Legal Officer, and the corresponding writ of execution was issued on April 6, 1994, by Clerk of Court Rogelio Fabro.
On May 3, 1994, Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy directed to the DPWH Regional Director, identifying the properties (scrap iron/junks at the Panacan depot) subject to levy.
The auction sale was conducted on May 18, 1994, at the DPWH depot in Panacan, Davao City, with Alex Bacquial emerging as the highest bidder and receiving a certificate of sale from the Sheriff.

On May 19, 1994, Alex Bacquial and Sheriff Paralisan attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties but were halted by Engr. Ramon Alejo, who maintained that many items in the depot were still serviceable and earmarked for repair.
In response, on May 20, 1994, Bacquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for a "break through" order to facilitate the withdrawal of the auctioned properties, which was granted by Judge Fuentes.
Bacquial, accompanied by Sheriff Paralisan, then physically removed the properties over several days until the lower court temporarily suspended the writ of execution.
On June 21, 1994, the lower court reaffirmed the validity of the writ favoring the defendants in the expropriation case.

Letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo prompted the Supreme Court to direct both Judge Fuentes and Sheriff Paralisan to provide clarifications regarding irregularities in the execution of the writ.
On August 23, 1995, the Supreme Court declared Sheriff Paralisan guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, dismissing him with forfeiture of benefits and barring reemployment in government service.
The Court Administrator was ordered to investigate Judge Fuentes, and the Office of the Solicitor General was directed to recover the value of the unlawfully removed equipment.

On January 15, 1996, Director Antonio E. Valenzuela of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended administrative and criminal charges against Judge Fuentes for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and for acts unbecoming of a judge.
On January 22, 1996, a criminal complaint was formally filed against Judge Fuentes by Director Valenzuela.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, through Graft Investigation Officer II Marivic A. Trabajo-Daray, directed Judge Fuentes to submit his counter-affidavit within ten days (February 6, 1996).
Judge Fuentes filed a motion on February 22, 1996, to dismiss the complaint and/or request that all records be forwarded to the Supreme Court, which was denied on March 15, 1996, leading to the current petition.

Whether the Ombudsman, while investigating acts allegedly committed by Judge Fuentes in the exercise of his official functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction by proceeding with a criminal complaint under R.A. No. 3019, Section 3(e).
Whether the initiation and continuation of such an investigation encroaches upon the exclusive administrative supervision of the judiciary by the Supreme Court.

Whether it is proper for the Ombudsman to independently investigate and file a criminal complaint against a judge for actions rendered within his judicial functions in the absence of an administrative charge by the Supreme Court.
Whether the Ombudsman’s intervention undermines the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary.