G.R. No. 63996 - Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Originally, Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate was owned by Cornelia and Frisca Dila and had a frontage along Parada Road measuring 51.90 meters.
Adjacent to Lot 860 was Lot 266, owned by Eusebio Francisco, with a frontage of 62.10 meters along Parada Road.
On December 3, 1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 executed a deed dividing the property by donating one-third each to Epifania Dila (a niece) and the children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, while reserving one-third for Cornelia Dila.
The subdivision led to the creation of:

The partition agreement ended the co-ownership, but it inadvertently isolated certain lots (860-A, 860-C, and 860-D) from the road because Lot 860-B, belonging to Epifania Dila, included the entire frontage along Parada Road.

Cornelia Dila sold Lot 860-A to the Eugenio sisters (Marcosa, Margarita, and Irinea Eugenio).
In 1971, the Eugenio sisters sold Lot 860-A to Cresencio J. Ramos.
In March 1972, after establishing a piggery on Lot 860-A, Ramos, through his lawyer, requested a right of way over Eusebio Francisco’s Lot 266.
Negotiations ensued but reached an impasse when Francisco’s proposed land exchange (1:3 ratio) was deemed unacceptable by Ramos.

Later in 1972, through the intercession of Councilor Tongco of Valenzuela, Ramos obtained a three-meter wide passageway through Lot 860-B of Epifania Dila, giving him access to Parada Road.
In August 1973, Ramos erected a ten-foot high concrete wall on Lot 860-A, thereby closing the passageway he had earlier secured.
Reacting to Ramos’ intentions, Francisco replaced the barbed-wire fence on his lot along Parada Road with a stone wall in August 1973.

Ramos instituted Civil Case No. 66-V-73 in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan seeking a permanent easement of right of way over Francisco’s Lot 266.
The trial court issued temporary writs of preliminary mandatory injunction based on a commission’s ocular inspection of Lots 860-A, 860-B, and 266.
After a series of motions—including Francisco’s attempt to dissolve the injunction—the trial court rendered a verdict six days after dissolving the injunctions:

Granted a temporary easement for Ramos on a 17.5 square meter portion of Francisco’s property at the rate of P20.00 per square meter, totaling P350.00.
Issued a permanent mandatory injunction ordering Francisco to remove obstructions (such as the adobe fence) along the defined right-of-way, again subject to payment of P350.00.
Dismissed the counterclaims of Francisco for moral, exemplary, and attorney’s fees.

Francisco appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision on September 7, 1982, and later denied his motion for reconsideration.
Francisco subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, contesting the sufficiency of the complaint and the failure to adhere to statutory requirements—especially those under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.

Evidence established that prior to seeking an easement through Francisco’s property, Ramos was already provided access to Parada Road via Lot 860-B.
Witness testimony and survey evidence (including tire marks and a survey sketch) confirmed the existence and usability of the passageway through Lot 860-B.
Ramos’ later act of blocking the passage by erecting a wall was pivotal in assessing his entitlement to a compulsory easement.

Whether the complaint should be dismissed for failing to aver that the demand for the easement was made only after payment of proper indemnity, as required by Article 649 of the Civil Code.
Whether it is proper to disregard the statutory pre-condition in Article 649 by invoking the “principle of substantial performance” under Article 1234 of the Civil Code.
Whether, pursuant to Article 649, Francisco’s Lot 266 may be classified as a servient estate subject to a compulsory easement of right of way in favor of Ramos’ Lot 860-A.
Whether the courts have the authority to create or establish judicial easements contrary to the clear requisites of the law.
Whether Ramos was entitled to secure a writ of mandatory injunction against Francisco, given the circumstances surrounding the alleged isolation and the existence of an alternative access provisioning.