Title
Framcar, Inc. vs. De Leon
Case
G.R. No. L-1329
Decision Date
May 15, 1947
Petitioner sought damages for a stolen taxicab; writ of attachment issued, later dissolved. SC reinstated writ, ruling civil action's suspension allows ancillary remedies.
A

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-1329)

Facts:

  • Parties and their roles
    • Ramcar, Incorporated filed a civil action and acted as the offended party in the related criminal case.
    • Respondent Dionisio de Leon was Judge of First Instance of Manila (respondent judge).
    • The defendants in the civil case and the accused in the criminal case were Daniel Francisco, Ulysses S. Tread, Jr., and Antonio Lloret.
  • Filing of the civil action and its allegations
    • On December 26, 1946, petitioner initiated a civil action for damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila by filing a complaint against the three defendants.
    • Petitioner prayed that defendants be sentenced to pay:
      • P5,000, the value of a stolen taxicab;
      • P500, an amount offered through newspapers to anyone who could point to the whereabouts of the taxicab;
      • P50 per day as the average minimum daily income of the car;
      • costs of the suit.
    • Petitioner also prayed, pending proceedings, that attachment of defendants’ properties be ordered upon such bond and in the amount as the court would deem proper to fix.
    • Petitioner alleged ownership of a Renault taxicab with motor No. 36428, painted black and white and provided with a taximeter, with a total value of P5,000.
    • Petitioner alleged that the taxicab was stolen about December 2, 1946 from the parking place in front of 1049 R. Hidalgo, Manila.
    • Petitioner alleged that, after many days of fruitless search, it offered P500 through newspapers to anyone who could point to the car’s whereabouts.
    • Petitioner alleged that the car, already dismantled, was later found and recovered from defendants’ possession.
    • Petitioner alleged that defendants confessed to petitioner’s representative and to the police authorities that they were the authors of:
      • the theft of the taxicab; and
      • the dismantling of the car to pieces, making it completely unserviceable and a total loss.
    • For purposes of attachment, petitioner alleged defendants were concealing their properties and were about to dispose of them with intent to defraud creditors, including petitioner.
  • Filing of the criminal case and timing relative to the civil case
    • Two days later, on December 28, 1946, an information for theft of the same described taxicab and based on the same facts alleged in the civil complaint was filed with the court of first instance against the same three defendants.
  • Issuance of attachment in the civil case
    • On January 2, 1947, after petitioner filed a bond in the amount of P5,000, the respondent judge issued a writ of attachment against defendants’ properties.
  • Proceedings on motions in the civil case and orders of the respondent judge
    • On January 14, 1947, defendant Daniel Francisco filed a petition praying for:
      • dismissal of the complaint; and
      • setting aside of the writ of attachment.
    • On January 27, 1947, defendant Ulysses S. Tread, Jr. moved for:
      • suspension of the time to file a responsive pleading to the complaint; and
      • dissolution of the writ of attachment.
    • On January 30, 1947, respondent judge issued an order:
      • denying dismissal of the complaint prayed for by Daniel Francisco; and
      • granting Daniel Francisco’s petition to set aside the writ of attachment against him.
    • On February 3, 1947, respondent judge granted the petition of Ulysses S. Tread, Jr. dated January 27, 1947.
    • On February 20, 1947, respondent judge denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
    • ...(Subscriber-Only)

Issues:

  • Whether the respondent judge erred in setting aside the January 2, 1947 writ of attachment based on Section 1(c) of Rule 107
    • Whether, after a criminal action had been commenced by filing the information, the respondent judge had been deprived ipso facto of power to issue preliminary and auxiliary writs in the suspended civil action.
    • Whether “suspension” of the civil action under Rule 107, Sec. 1(c) operates as “termination” that wipes out all manifestations of the civil action, including the issuance of attachment.
    • Whether the writ of attachment could be maintained despite the civil action being subject to suspension upon the commencement of the criminal action.
  • Whether the civil action had been “impliedly instituted” with the criminal action such that auxiliary writs could issue within the framework of the criminal case
    • Whether, under Rule 107, Sec. 1(a), where the civil action was not expressly waived or reserved for separate institution, the civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
    • Whether, within the criminal action that includes the implied civil branch, the offended party may obtain preliminary writs such as attachment.
  • Whether the dissent view required denial of force and effect to the writ of attachment issued on January 2, 1947 due...(Subscriber-Only)

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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